The War Trap Revisited
A Revised Expected Utility Model
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3440372 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bruce Bueno De Mesquita (0000-0001-8582-8330, University of Rochester, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1985 |
| Volume | 79 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 156-177 |
| Publication date | 1985-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/1956125 |
| OpenAlex | W2334073728 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 100 |
| References cited | 17 |
The expected utility framework developed in The War Trap is revised to correct several deficiencies. Risk-taking orientations are now treated as an integral part of the model by introducing concavity or convexity into the utility functions. The zero-sum properties of the theory are largely eliminated, and the tendency toward interpersonal comparisons of utility is removed. Several earlier results are replicated with the new model, and with annual capabilities data. New propositions are deduced that identify important limitations on conflict initiation, and relationships resulting from differences in perceptions are tested. Support is found for the contention that the revised version of the theory, of which the original model is a special case, is a powerful tool for integrating many extant hypotheses about conflict and for explaining a substantial portion of the tendency for some threats to escalate to violence or warfare and for others to be resolved peacefully
Convexity · Econometrics · Economics · Expected utility hypothesis · Extant taxon · Financial economics · Geography · Interpersonal communication · Mathematical economics · Perception · Positive economics · Trap (plumbing · Zero (linguistics · Agricultural risk and resilience · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · Health and Conflict Studies · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 100 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,38 |
| Citation span | 1984 - 2026 (43) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 100 |