Changing Aspirations, Limited Attention, and War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6412005 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul A Anderson (0000-0001-6478-2505, Lawrence University), Timothy J Mckeown (0000-0002-3947-3409, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) |
| Year | 1987 |
| Volume | 40 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-29 |
| Publication date | 1987-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | World Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0043-8871 • E-ISSN: 1086-3338 |
| Publisher | Project MUSE (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2010192 |
| OpenAlex | W2012293372 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 28 |
| References cited | 34 |
The authors present a theory of the general enabling conditions for war which predicts that war is possible, though not inevitable, when the conditions of the theory are satisfied. Whether a war will actually occur depends upon the idiosyncratic situational factors that are outside the scope of the theory. Three conditions make war possible: (i) Aspirations do not match achievements: governments only initiate wars when their achieved share of global capabilities differs from their aspired share of capabilities. (2) Salience: governments only initiate wars against other governments when there is a history of substantial interaction. (3) Power: governments never initiate wars against other governments that have a substantially greater military capacity. These conditions may be viewed as a series of three filters that identify pairs of countries between which war is possible. The theory predicts that wars will not occur in any dyad that does not pass through all the filters. In testing this theory for all nations between 1816 and 1980, the authors allowed for the fact that governments may preemptively initiate wars against other governments that meet these conditions
Development economics · Dyad · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Positive economics · Power (physics · Salience (neuroscience · Scope (computer science · Situational ethics · Computer Science · Corruption and Economic Development · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Natural Resources and Economic Development · Psychology · Social Psychology
War and Peace in International Rivalry
When and Why Do Innovation Policies Change? A Performance Feedback Perspective
Uneven Power and the Pursuit of Peace
Why Forecasts Fail
Alliance and Border Effects on the War Behavior of States
Status Quo Orientation, Capabilities, and Patterns of War Initiation in Dyadic Rivalries
The evolution of disputes
Time Present and Time Past
Testing Dynamic Theories of Conflict
Turning down the heat
Advancing the scientific study of war
Great powers, cycles of relative capability and crises in world politics
Deterrence Theory Discussion
How Not to Be Lakatos Intolerant
Rational Deterrence
Hot Hand
Economics, Philosophy of History, and the “Single Dynamic” of Power Cycle Theory
Democratic Dominoes
Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle
Testing Power-Transition Theory Using Alternative Measures of National Capabilities
System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict among the Great Powers
United Nations intervention and recurring conflict
Constraints, states, and wars
Dangerous Liaisons
The Methodology of Necessary Conditions
Extended Deterrence, Superpower Control, and Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1962-76
One Thing Leads to Another
The Escalation of Great Power Militarized Disputes
Quantitative international politics
Ambiguity and choice in organizations
Between Peace and War
Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes
A behavioral theory of the firm
Essence of Decision
Política entre las naciones
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism
The War Ledger
The Paranoia of the Powerful
The Correlates of War II
The Diplomatic Importance of States, 1816–1970
War and Expected-Utility Theory
Power Analysis and World Politics
Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976
Simple Choices and Complex Calculations
Preventing Systemic War
Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System, 1815–1964
Case Selection, Conceptualizations and Basic Logic in the Study of War
Attributes of National Alliance Membership and War Participation, 1815-1965
Justifications and Precedents as Constraints in Foreign Policy Decision- Making
Toward a Theory of Revolution
Reason and War
The War Trap Revisited
Prediction Analysis in Political Research
War and the Cycle of Relative Power
The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence
| Unique citing works | 28 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,76 |
| Citation span | 1989 - 2023 (35) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 28 |