Third-Party Participation in Wars

Dados Bibliográficos

ID6284111
AutoresChae-Han Kim (Hallym University, South Korea, autor correspondente)
Ano1991
Volume35
Fascículo4
Páginas659-677
Data de publicação1991-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
EditoraSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002791035004005
OpenAlexW1985254480
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas26
Referências citadas20

This article investigates the calculus of third-party participation in ongoing wars. Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita have shown that under an expected utility model of third-party participation, the probability of a nation's joining is in inverse proportion to the ex ante probability of other nations' joining. In seeming contradiction Yamamoto and Bremer have argued that one major power's decision to enter a war increases the probability that other powers will do likewise. In this article it is shown that these two perspectives, in fact, do not contradict one another. It is found that a nation is more likely to join a war when the initial belligerents in the conflict have few formal alliances, and when, despite ex ante beliefs, many other nations have already joined in the war. It is also shown that a third party is more likely to join the war in support of a friend than in opposition to a foe

Contradiction · Economics · Epistemology · Ex-ante · Join (topology · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · Spanish Civil War · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics · Political Conflict and Governance