The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284680 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul K Huth (University of Michigan, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 270-290 |
| Publication date | 1990-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002790034002005 |
| OpenAlex | W2129450011 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 39 |
| References cited | 29 |
Three questions are addressed in this study: (1) Does a nuclear retaliatory capability contribute to extended deterrence against a nonnuclear power? (2) If so, is the deterrent value of nuclear weapons contingent upon the prior credible threat of conventional armed engagement by the defender? (3) Or, is the deterrent impact of nuclear weapons so potent that the conventional balance of forces has little deterrent impact? Competing hypotheses are formulated and then tested by probit analysis. The empirical findings indicate that (a) nuclear weapons do contribute to extended deterrence success, but (b) that effect is not contingent upon the prior threat of conventional armed conflict, and (c) there is an inverse relationship between the conventional balance of forces and the extended deterrent role of nuclear weapons
Balance (ability · Biology · Deterrence theory · Econometrics · Economics · Law and economics · Nuclear power · Nuclear weapon · Political science · Probit · Probit model · Statistics · Value (mathematics · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Mathematics · Nuclear Issues and Defense · Psychology
The Evolution of International Security Studies
Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests
South Korea’s Deterrence Strategy Against North Korea’s WMD
Balance of Power Redux
Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation
Variations on a theme
Nuclear Deterrence Theory
Force and Influence in International Crises
Crisis escalation
Observing the unobservable
Classical deterrence theory
The Strong, the Weak, and the Honored
Democracies in international crisis
The logic of secret alliances
Uncertainty and the role of the pawn in extended deterrence
Intergovernmental Organizations and Democratic Victory in International Crises
Domestic-Level Diversionary Theory of War
Social Scientific Analysis of Nuclear Weapons
Joint Military Exercises and Crisis Dynamics on the Korean Peninsula
The Unforeseen Consequences of Extended Deterrence
Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes
Nuclear Strategy, Nonproliferation, and the Causes of Foreign Nuclear Deployments
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict
What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict
Nuclear Taboo And War Initiation in Regional Conflicts
Winning with the Bomb
Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests
The Perils of Predicting Proliferation
System Uncertainty, Risk Propensity, and International Conflict among the Great Powers
Conventional Wisdom? The Effect of Nuclear Proliferation on Armed Conflict, 1945-2001
Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve
Nukes with Numbers
Signaling Alliance Commitments
A Unified Theory and Test of Extended Immediate Deterrence
Leaving theory behind
Some Simple Calculations on Democracy and War Involvement
The Outcomes of Military Buildups
Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918-94
Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict
Nuclear blackmail and nuclear balance
The command and control of nuclear forces
Prospect Theory
Deterrence and Defense
The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East
Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics
Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management
The Long Peace
The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons
A statistical model for the analysis of ordinal level dependent variables
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States
Deterrence
Testing Deterrence Theory
What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980
Extended Deterrence with Nuclear Weapons
Terror without Deterrence
Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance
Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation
Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War
Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation
Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice
Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD
Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age
To Cap the Volcano
The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons
| Unique citing works | 39 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,15 |
| Citation span | 1992 - 2026 (35) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 39 |