Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests
An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284059 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James D Fearon (University of Chicago, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 236-269 |
| Publication date | 1994-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002794038002004 |
| OpenAlex | W2115574315 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 223 |
| References cited | 28 |
Conventional wisdom holds that in international disputes, a state's military threast are more likely to work the more the state is favored by the balance of power or the balance of interests. Analysis of a game-theoretic model of crisis signaling substantially refines and revises this claim. Due to selection effects arising from strategic behavior, measures of the relative strength of a defender's interests that are available before a crisis begins (ex ante) should be related to the failure of the defender's threats during the crisis. Ex ante measures of the defender's relative military strength should correlate with the success of the defender's crisis threats, but due to strategic dynamics that are not grasped by the standard arguments. A reanalysis of Huth and Russett's data on immediate deterrent threats lends support for these and other hypotheses drawn from the game-theoretic treatment
Balance (ability · Economics · Ex-ante · Macroeconomics · Microeconomics · Power (physics · State (computer science · Work (physics · Computer Science · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Political Conflict and Governance · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East · Psychology
The Limits of Grand Strategy
Taiwan and the Danger of a Sino-American War
Experiencing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Military Threats
Statements of Resolve
American Grand Strategy and East Asian Security in the Twenty-First Century
Interdependence and Conflict
Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making
War and Peace in International Rivalry
The Surprising Logic of Transparency
Deterrence Now
The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century
The empirical evidence of audience costs theory
Turkey-West Relations
Shooting From the Hip
Estimating Impact
Reputation and Civil War
The Bad, the Good, and the Ugly
Dispute Initiation and Alliance Obligations in Regional Economic Institutions
Why Strategic Clarity Is Problematic for US Policy on Taiwan
Exit, Voice, Loyalty … or Deliberate Obstruction? Non-Collective Everyday Resistance under Oppression
Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies
Exploding the Powder Keg Myth
When Governments Collide in the Taiwan Strait
The hard truths about soft power
Testing the impact of geopolitics on European democratic countries’ soft power use
Beyond tit-for-tat in cyberspace
Ready to Fire? Missile Tests and Crisis Involvement
Do US Troop Withdrawals Cause Instability? Evidence from Two Exogenous Shocks on the Korean Peninsula
Do States Really Sink Costs to Signal Resolve
The Persistence of US Conflict Behavior
Trade Relationships and Asymmetric Crisis Perception
Offending the audience
Doubts down under
High Stakes Indeed
Tipping Points
Signalling credibility? The IMF and catalytic finance
Signalling through implicature
Negative sanctions don’t work (mostly)
Contingent Authoritarian Regionalism
Asymmetry of power and attention in alliance politics
Crisis as practice
Are complex game models empirically relevant
Taking the cue
Measuring Uncertainty in International Relations
Between indifference and coercion
Reputation for Resolve, Interests, and Conflict
Aegean Territorial Waters Conflict
Force and Influence in International Crises
The use of fear and anger to alter crisis initiation
Interdependence and Conflict
Does third-party trade reduce conflict? Credible signaling versus opportunity costs
Power and Deterrence in Alliance Relationships
Introduction to special issue
Charting A Course To Conflict
State Characteristics and Crisis Outcomes
Ending Economic Coercion
Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001
The EU and rule of law development in Kosovo
Crisis escalation
Asymmetric Proliferation and Nuclear War
Global Power Transitions and Regional Interests
Observing the unobservable
Strategy and Selection in International Relations
Oil Prices and International Conflict
Alliance Proximity and Effectiveness of Extended Deterrence
Escalation at the outset
Questions of Research Design in Developing New Tests of the Democratic Peace
Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence
The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes
The success and use of economic sanctions
Democracies in international crisis
Selection Effects and Deterrence
Selection Effects and World Politics Research
Theory, Data, and Deterrence
Between conformity and innovation
Why do civil wars occur? Another look at the theoretical dichotomy of opportunity versus grievance
Defeating transnational insurgencies
Deterring Terrorism
The Modeling Enterprise and Security Studies
Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait
Bilateral Conflict
Social norms and the traditional deterrence game
Madness as Strategy? Leader Reputation and the Logic of Elite Purges in Autocracies
The Losing Battle of Goliath
Peace Negotiations and Civilian Targeting
Power Cycles, Risk Propensity, and Great-Power Deterrence
Escalation of interstate crises of conflictual dyads
The Kyoto Protocol
International Organization as a Seal of Approval
Strategic Interaction and Interstate Crises
Estimating the Severity of the WikiLeaks U.S. Diplomatic Cables Disclosure
Costly Signals
Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis
Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests
Repetitive Military Challenges and Recurrent International Conflicts, 1918-1994
Opposites Do Not Attract
Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations
The Surprising Logic of Transparency
Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
Deterrence
Force, order, and justice
The wages of war, 1816-1965
Nuclear blackmail and nuclear balance
Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War
Conflict Among Nations
Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816–1980
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
War and Reason
Israel and Conventional Deterrence
Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence
Conventional Deterrence
Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War
Job Market Signaling
Rational Deterrence
What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980
Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976
The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons
Domestic Political Structure and War Behavior
Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976
Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation
Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve
Nuclear blackmail and nuclear balance
Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War
Nuclear Deterrence, Counterforce Strategies, and the Incentive to Strike First
General Deterrence between Enduring Rivals
| Unique citing works | 223 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 7,19 |
| Citation span | 1995 - 2026 (32) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 223 |