Peace Negotiations and Civilian Targeting

Bibliographic Data

ID10071781
Authorsİpek Ece Şener (0000-0003-2513-0103, Harvard University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume69
Issue9
Pages1580-1607
Publication date2025-01-05
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/00220027241308270
OpenAlexW4406081233
LanguageEN
References cited62

Does the participation of armed actors in peace talks influence their strategy of targeting civilians? I argue that before peace talks belligerents have incentives to demonstrate their military strength and respect for humanitarian standards to international third parties. Thus, they are more likely to spare civilians and discriminately target enemy combatants before international talks. Using change point analysis and surrogate data testing on the daily casualty and territorial control data for the Syrian Civil War, I show that belligerents engaged in negotiations incite more combatant and fewer civilian casualties in the enemy territory immediately before an international meeting is to be held. These findings underscore that international parties can drive combatants to avoid civilian victimization before peace talks by offering them a seat at the negotiation table

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