Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283327 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Zeev Maoz (0000-0002-2616-5140, University of Haifa, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1983 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 195-229 |
| Publication date | 1983-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002783027002001 |
| OpenAlex | W2141957041 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 78 |
| References cited | 28 |
This study attempts to explain the recurring empirical observation that initiators of interstate disputes, both those that escalated into wars and those that ended otherwise, are disproportionately likely to win. Two competing models are developed: (1) The capability model argues that the outcome of the dispute is a function of the balance of capabilities among the protagonists and that the strongest prevails. (2) The resolve model argues that dispute outcomes are determined by the balance of motivation and resolve among the protagonists; that is, the actor with the highest level of resolve is likely to win. A random sample of 164 disputes is used to test these two models. The findings suggest that capabilities are unrelated to dispute outcomes, whereas resolve variables are consistently related to dispute outcomes. The implications for conflict management and conflict escalation are discussed
Balance (ability · Conflict management · Economics · Function (biology · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Positive economics · Sample (material · Test (biology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Global trade and economics · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology
Military Threats
The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0
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Microfoundations in international relations
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Force and Influence in International Crises
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The evolution of disputes
Escalation at the outset
A Behavioral Model of Dispute Escalation
Balancing behavior in the interstate system, 1816–1976
Advancing the scientific study of war
Power, resolve and bargaining in international crises
Power disparities and paradoxical conflict outcomes∗
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| Unique citing works | 78 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,81 |
| Citation span | 1983 - 2026 (44) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 78 |