Beyond Parsimony

Rethinking Theories of Coercive Bargaining

Bibliographic Data

ID6060551
AuthorsRichard Ned Lebow (0000-0002-1972-141X, The Ohio State University, corresponding author)
Year1998
Volume4
Issue1
Pages31-66
Publication date1998-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of International Relations (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1354-0661 • E-ISSN: 1460-3713
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/1354066198004001002
OpenAlexW4236899864
LanguageEN
Citations received8
References cited48

Theories of deterrence and compellence incorporate behavioral and political assumptions. The behavioral assumptions place unreasonable informational and analytical requirements on policy-makers. The political assumptions misconstrue the process of risk assessment, exaggerate the ability of leaders to estimate the risks inherent in their threats and shape adversarial estimates of their resolve. These problems may help explain why deterrence and compellence often fail when practiced by rational and attentive actors against equally rational and attentive targets. Some of the political and behavioral assumptions of deterrence and compellence are unique, but most are shared with other rational theories of bargaining. My critique has implications for these theories, and they are spelled out in the conclusion. I illustrate my argument with examples from American and Soviet decision-making in the Cuban missile crisis

Adversarial system · Argument (complex analysis) · Deterrence (psychology) · Deterrence theory · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Sociology · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

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