Modeling Deterrence and International Crises

Bibliographic Data

ID6284448
AuthorsJean-Pierre P Langlois (San Francisco State University, corresponding author)
Year1989
Volume33
Issue1
Pages67-83
Publication date1989-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002789033001003
OpenAlexW1999227321
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited15

The continuous Prisoner's Dilemma is a reasonable model for nuclear crises (usually represented by “Chicken”), and for the arms race. This article addresses the existence of credible deterrence strategies that promote cooperation as a dynamically stable steady state. Decisions made repeatedly in time are the selection by each side of a level of hostility. Assessment of the resulting situation is represented by a utility function for each player. As the game proceeds, players are concerned with the current situation as well as with the future consequences of their present decisions. Thus each side must formulate intentions and expectations of each other's future behavior and use them to infer their own present optimal decisions. A formal concept of deterrence strategy is introduced: It promises the other side retaliation in kind to prevent any gain from aggressive play, and it inflicts increasing losses as a result of escalation. If one side adopts such a deterrence strategy, the other side cannot do better than acting similarly, and when both sides adopt it, they both enjoy optimal decision rules that confirm intentions and expectations. The resulting dynamical system endows cooperation with asymptotic stability provided the threats of retaliation contain a fair mix of firmness and restraint

Deterrence (psychology · Deterrence theory · Dilemma · Economics · Function (biology · Game theory · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Prisoner's dilemma · State (computer science · Computer Science · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models

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