War Aims and War Outcomes

Why Powerful States Lose Limited Wars

Bibliographic Data

ID6285913
AuthorsPatricia L Sullivan (0000-0002-0028-9452, Department of International Affairs University of Georgia, Athens, corresponding author)
Year2007
Volume51
Issue3
Pages496-524
Publication date2007-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002707300187
OpenAlexW2810188312
LanguageEN
Citations received52
References cited54

Why are states with tremendous advantages in capabilities and resources often unable to attain even limited objectives vis-à-vis much weaker adversaries? The theory I develop focuses on how the nature of a strong state's war aims affects prewar uncertainty about the cost of victory. I argue that the relative magnitude of the effect of military strength and resolve on war outcomes varies with the nature of the object at stake and that strong states become more likely to underestimate the cost of victory as the impact of resolve increases relative to that of war-fighting capacity. I evaluate the empirical implications of this theory against the historical record provided by the universe of major power military interventions since World War II. The results challenge both existing theories and conventional wisdom about the impact of factors such as military strength, resolve, troop commitment levels, and war-fighting strategies on asymmetric war outcomes

Development economics · Economics · Military operations other than war · Military strategy · Object (grammar · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Spanish Civil War · State (computer science · Victory · World War II · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

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