Rational Quagmires
Attrition, Learning, and War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12802465 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Colin Krainin (corresponding author), Caroline Thomas (0000-0002-1908-8466), Thomas Wiseman |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 369-400 |
| Publication date | 2020-07-06 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Quarterly Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1554-0626 • E-ISSN: 1554-0634 |
| Publisher | Now Publishers (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.1561/100.00018008 |
| OpenAlex | W3013358808 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 53 |
We argue that asymmetric information can cause long wars. We present a bargaining model of war between unequal opponents: the stronger side (“government”) is uncertain about the strength of the weaker side (“rebels”), which deteriorates during fighting. The model predicts that wars may be lengthy, as fighting alternates with settlement offers. Surprisingly, increasing the government’s commitment ability or reducing uncertainty may make war more likely. The government may choose to continue fighting after early failures: it may become more optimistic that the rebels are about to collapse even as the collapse does not arrive, and it can increase its expected payoff ex ante by committing to continue a wasteful war. Our analysis helps to explain, for example, the U.S. experience in Vietnam
Attrition · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Positive economics · Sociology · Indian History and Philosophy · Medicine
Increasing risk
Reputation and Civil War
Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict1
War and Stability in Dynamic International Systems
Preventive War as a Result of Long-Term Shifts in Power
Credibility and Commitment in Crisis Bargaining
Bargaining with a biased autocrat
Fighting Battles, Winning Wars
War Aims and War Outcomes
How a War Ends
Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars
Slow to Learn
Bargaining and the Nature of War
Complicating Commitment
Does Attrition Behavior Help Explain the Duration of Interstate Wars? A Game Theoretic and Empirical Analysis
Known Unknowns
Rationalist explanations for war
A Dynamic Theory of Nuclear Proliferation and Preventive War
War as a Commitment Problem
A Bargaining Model of War and Peace
The Armed Peace
Building Reputation
Bargaining and Learning While Fighting
Bargaining and War
Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War
Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power
Mutual Optimism and War
Does the Principle of Convergence Really Hold? War, Uncertainty and the Failure of Bargaining
What Is Civil War
Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others
The Inefficient Use of Power
The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
International System and Technologies of Rebellion
Conflict, War, and Redistribution
Information, Power, and War
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2023 (2) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |