The Armed Peace
A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232046 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bahar Leventoğlu (0000-0001-5687-8451, Duke University), Branislav L Slantchev (0000-0003-3404-5242, University of California San Diego) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 755-771 |
| Publication date | 2007-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00279.x |
| OpenAlex | W2134114273 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 64 |
| References cited | 30 |
According to a leading rationalist explanation, war can break out when a large, rapid shift of power causes a credible commitment problem. This mechanism does not specify how inefficient fighting can resolve this cause, so it is an incomplete explanation of war. We present a complete information model of war as a sequence of battles and show that although opportunities for a negotiated settlement arise throughout, the very desirability of peace creates a commitment problem that undermines its likelihood. Because players have incentives to settle as soon as possible, they cannot credibly threaten to fight long enough if an opponent launches a surprise attack. This decreases the expected duration and costs of war and causes mutual deterrence to fail. Fighting's destructiveness improves the credibility of these threats by decreasing the benefits from continuing the war and can eventually lead to peace. In equilibrium players can only terminate war at specific windows of opportunity and fighting results in escalating costs that can leave both players worse off at the time peace is negotiated than a full concession would have before the war began
Adversary · Asymmetric warfare · Computer security · Credibility · Deterrence theory · Economics · Incentive · Just war theory · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political economy · Political science · Power (physics · Settlement (finance · Spanish Civil War · Surprise · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Finance · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology
Fuller’s theory of war and the changes in the concepts of warfare in the second half of XX century
Mutually Hurting or Mutually Beneficial Stalemates? Alternative Logics Shaping Conflict Outcomes
Military Threats
Will Covid-19 Cause a War? Understanding the Case of the U.S. and China
Rational Quagmires
Public Private Partnership with Chinese Characteristics
Negotiating Peace with Your Enemy
Changing capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargaining
Weak sovereignty and interstate war
Ending Economic Sanctions in the Shadow of Bargaining Problems
Rational Origins of Revisionist War
Uncertainty and War Duration
Conventional arms control and military balance in Europe
Simultaneous Battles and Sequential Battles in Bargaining Models of War
Nationalism and war for territory
Centers of gravity and war outcomes
Time is on my side? The impact of timing and dispute type on militarized conflict duration
The bargaining framework and Russia's invasion of Ukraine
The impact of coups d’état on civil war duration
Preventive war and sovereign debt
Information problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine
Which wars spread? Commitment problems and military intervention
Wars of Succession
Conceal or Reveal? Managing Clandestine Military Capabilities in Peacetime Competition
Speaking with one voice
Shifting power, interstate war, and domestic politics
Coalition Politics and War Termination
Causal beliefs and war termination
Denial and punishment in war
Symbolic victories and strategic risk
Deterrence in Contests
Why Was the American Revolution a War? A Rationalist Interpretation
Red lines versus negotiables
Exploring the Dynamics of Latent Variable Models
War and Stability in Dynamic International Systems
Challenges to the Study of Long Wars
Every Story Has a Beginning, Middle, and an End (But Not Always in That Order)
Rationalist Experiments on War
Preventive War as a Result of Long-Term Shifts in Power
Credibility and Commitment in Crisis Bargaining
The calm before the storm
Crisis bargaining, domestic opposition, and tragic wars
Logics of Violence in Criminal War
Painful Words
Battle Diffusion Matters
Information, Commitment, and War
External Subsidies and Lasting Peace
Titans that Clash and a State that Buffers
Evaluating Conflict Dynamics
Dictators and Death
When Will States Strike First? Battlefield Advantages and Rationalist War
Talking While Fighting
Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution
Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power
Mutual Optimism and War
From war to peace
Incumbents, successors, and crisis bargaining
Policy Punctuations in Colorado Water Law
Interstate War Battle dataset (1823-2003)
Domestic uncertainty, third-party resolve, and international conflict
Polarization, Fractionalization and Conflict
Taking Sides in Wars of Attrition
The Paradox of Civilization
Borrowed Power
The practical negotiator
In the Shadow of Power
The Causes of War
Negotiating Peace
Territory and Commitment
The Paradox of Peace
Escalation and Cooperation in Conflict Situations
Bargaining and the Nature of War
The Dollar Auction game
International Escalation and the Dollar Auction
Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin
Rationalist explanations for war
War as a Commitment Problem
War Is in the Error Term
Bargainingtheory Andinternationalconflict
Bargaining and Fighting
How Initiators End Their Wars
Bargaining and Learning While Fighting
Bargaining and War
Mutual Optimism and War
The Resolution of Conflict
Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others
The Inefficient Use of Power
The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
Guns, Butter, and Anarchy
The Power to Hurt
Military Coercion in Interstate Crises
Peace, War, and the Balance of Power
| Unique citing works | 64 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,37 |
| Citation span | 2007 - 2026 (20) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 62 |