Rationalist Experiments on War

Datos Bibliográficos

ID6342140
AutoresKai Quek (0000-0001-8403-4280, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, autor de correspondencia)
Año2017
Volumen5
Número1
Páginas123-142
Fecha de publicación2017-01-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaPolitical Science Research and Methods (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 2049-8470 • E-ISSN: 2049-8489
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/psrm.2015.24
OpenAlexW3124726665
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas12
Referencias citadas52

Private information and the commitment problem are central to the rationalist theory of war, but causal evidence is scarce, as rationalist explanations for war are difficult to test with observational data. I design laboratory experiments to isolate the effects of private information and the commitment problem on the risk of conflict. I find that the commitment problem sharply increases the incidence of conflict, but there is no significant difference in conflict incidence with or without private information in the shadow of shifting power. I also investigate the realism of the positive experimental results with a case study of Japan’s decisionmaking on the eve of the Pacific War. The permutation of formal, experimental and historical methods applies the strength of one method to compensate for the weakness of another. Convergent results from the different methods strengthen the causal inference

Causal inference · Econometrics · Economics · Epistemology · Inference · Observational study · Political science · Positive economics · Power (physics · Private information retrieval · Realism · Shadow (psychology · Statistics · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Philosophy · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology