Deterrence in Contests

Bibliographic Data

ID9723864
AuthorsGiovanni De Luca (0000-0002-5306-7714, IPCOS (Belgium)), Giacomo De Luca (LICOS University of Leuven Belgium), Petros G Sekeris (0000-0003-0402-2744, CRED University of Namur Belgium)
Year2013
Volume80
Issue317
Pages171-189
Publication date2013-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0335.2012.00940.x
OpenAlexW2058399975
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited33

This paper explores the role of deterrence in contests. As a general rule, we show that for a deterrence strategy to be played by rational agents, it is necessary that the contest be destructive. We show for a very general class of functions that pure strategy deterrence equilibria where contestants deter one another do not exist. A corollary of this finding is that under fairly general conditions, agents should always be expected to engage in contests. Applied to international relations, our results imply that war is always a potential outcome despite deterrence attempts

Class (philosophy) · CONTEST · Corollary · Deterrence (psychology) · Deterrence theory · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory) · Political science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy

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