Petros G Sekeris
Biographic Data
| ID | 1165592 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Petros G Sekeris |
| GIVEN NAMES | Petros G |
| FAMILY NAME | Sekeris |
| SIGNATURE | SEKERIS P G |
| AFFILIATIONS | TBS Education |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0402-2744 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 29 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2012 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Overconfidence in tullock contests
The political economy of group domination and pre-electoral violence
Income and the (eventual) rise of democracy
The limits of behavioral nudges to increase youth turnout: Experimental evidence from two French elections
There is a significant gap in turnout between young people and older voters. The failure to instill a voting habit at an early age may have long term consequences in terms of future political participation as well as on other civic behaviors. Using a pre-registered online experiment with 3790 subjects, we implemented behavioral interventions aiming to stimulate youth turnout in the 2022 French presidential election. We rely on an innovative incen…
The Limits of Behavioral Nudges to Increase Youth Turnout: Experimental Evidence from Two French Elections
Conflict under the shadow of elections
Non‐linear revenue evaluation
In this article, we investigate different market structures where decision makers are incentivized by both profit and revenue. Our innovation is that we consider managers that evaluate revenue in a non‐linear way, exhibiting diminishing marginal utility. This implies that incremental changes in revenue—for example, due to demand shocks—generate production choices that depend on the existing revenue base of the firm. We show that this intuitively …
Oil above Water: Economic Interdependence and Third-party Intervention
We explore economic incentives for third parties to intervene in ongoing internal wars. We develop a three-party model of the decision to intervene in conflict that highlights the role of the economic benefits accruing from the intervention and the potential costs. We present novel empirical results on the role of oil in motivating third-party military intervention. We find that the likelihood of a third-party intervention increases when (a) the …
Self-Containment: Achieving Peace in Anarchic Settings
In anarchic settings, potential rivals can be dragged into arms races degenerating in open wars out of mutual suspicion. We propose a novel commitment device for contestants to avoid both arming and fighting. We assume that the military decides the armament levels of a country, while the civilian decides whether to attack a rival country. When these decision-making bodies perfectly communicate, the decision makers are unable to credibly communica…
Deterrence in Contests
This paper explores the role of deterrence in contests. As a general rule, we show that for a deterrence strategy to be played by rational agents, it is necessary that the contest be destructive. We show for a very general class of functions that pure strategy deterrence equilibria where contestants deter one another do not exist. A corollary of this finding is that under fairly general conditions, agents should always be expected to engage in co…
Land inequality and conflict intensity
Oil above Water: Economic Interdependence and Third-party Intervention
We explore economic incentives for third parties to intervene in ongoing internal wars. We develop a three-party model of the decision to intervene in conflict that highlights the role of the economic benefits accruing from the intervention and the potential costs. We present novel empirical results on the role of oil in motivating third-party military intervention. We find that the likelihood of a third-party intervention increases when (a) the …
Income and the (eventual) rise of democracy
Deterrence in Contests
This paper explores the role of deterrence in contests. As a general rule, we show that for a deterrence strategy to be played by rational agents, it is necessary that the contest be destructive. We show for a very general class of functions that pure strategy deterrence equilibria where contestants deter one another do not exist. A corollary of this finding is that under fairly general conditions, agents should always be expected to engage in co…
Self-Containment: Achieving Peace in Anarchic Settings
In anarchic settings, potential rivals can be dragged into arms races degenerating in open wars out of mutual suspicion. We propose a novel commitment device for contestants to avoid both arming and fighting. We assume that the military decides the armament levels of a country, while the civilian decides whether to attack a rival country. When these decision-making bodies perfectly communicate, the decision makers are unable to credibly communica…
Land inequality and conflict intensity
Land inequality and conflict intensity
Deterrence in Contests
This paper explores the role of deterrence in contests. As a general rule, we show that for a deterrence strategy to be played by rational agents, it is necessary that the contest be destructive. We show for a very general class of functions that pure strategy deterrence equilibria where contestants deter one another do not exist. A corollary of this finding is that under fairly general conditions, agents should always be expected to engage in co…
Self-Containment: Achieving Peace in Anarchic Settings
In anarchic settings, potential rivals can be dragged into arms races degenerating in open wars out of mutual suspicion. We propose a novel commitment device for contestants to avoid both arming and fighting. We assume that the military decides the armament levels of a country, while the civilian decides whether to attack a rival country. When these decision-making bodies perfectly communicate, the decision makers are unable to credibly communica…
Oil above Water: Economic Interdependence and Third-party Intervention
We explore economic incentives for third parties to intervene in ongoing internal wars. We develop a three-party model of the decision to intervene in conflict that highlights the role of the economic benefits accruing from the intervention and the potential costs. We present novel empirical results on the role of oil in motivating third-party military intervention. We find that the likelihood of a third-party intervention increases when (a) the …
Non‐linear revenue evaluation
In this article, we investigate different market structures where decision makers are incentivized by both profit and revenue. Our innovation is that we consider managers that evaluate revenue in a non‐linear way, exhibiting diminishing marginal utility. This implies that incremental changes in revenue—for example, due to demand shocks—generate production choices that depend on the existing revenue base of the firm. We show that this intuitively …
The Limits of Behavioral Nudges to Increase Youth Turnout: Experimental Evidence from Two French Elections
Conflict under the shadow of elections
The political economy of group domination and pre-electoral violence
Income and the (eventual) rise of democracy
The limits of behavioral nudges to increase youth turnout: Experimental evidence from two French elections
There is a significant gap in turnout between young people and older voters. The failure to instill a voting habit at an early age may have long term consequences in terms of future political participation as well as on other civic behaviors. Using a pre-registered online experiment with 3790 subjects, we implemented behavioral interventions aiming to stimulate youth turnout in the 2022 French presidential election. We rely on an innovative incen…
Overconfidence in tullock contests
Economics (9 works) · Political science (7 works) · Law (6 works) · Law (4 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Public finance (4 works) · Demographic economics (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works)