Self-Containment

Achieving Peace in Anarchic Settings

Bibliographic Data

ID10071480
AuthorsA Adam (0000-0002-9483-1547, University of Ioannina), Petros G Sekeris (0000-0003-0402-2744, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume61
Issue1
Pages173-203
Publication date2015-01-16
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0022002714564428
OpenAlexW2172822528
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited66

In anarchic settings, potential rivals can be dragged into arms races degenerating in open wars out of mutual suspicion. We propose a novel commitment device for contestants to avoid both arming and fighting. We assume that the military decides the armament levels of a country, while the civilian decides whether to attack a rival country. When these decision-making bodies perfectly communicate, the decision makers are unable to credibly communicate to their foe their willingness not to arm and not to attack, thus implying that war ensues. With imperfect information, however, peace may ensue as countries credibly signal to their rival a more peaceful stance since contestants are more reluctant to enter in an armed confrontation with a potentially understaffed army. Using data on the 1975 to 2001 period, we provide supportive evidence that in countries where the head of the state or the defense minister are military officers, and are therefore better informed of their armies’ fighting preparedness, the likelihood of observing an international conflict is higher

Business · Computer security · Economics · Imperfect · Political economy · Political science · Preparedness · State (computer science · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

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