Slow to Learn
Bargaining, Uncertainty, and the Calculus of Conquest
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284450 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William Spaniel (0000-0002-6733-385X, University of Pittsburgh, corresponding author), Peter Bils (0000-0002-4954-1671, University of Rochester) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 62 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 774-796 |
| Publication date | 2018-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002716662688 |
| OpenAlex | W2507553567 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 48 |
If peace fails due to incomplete information and incentives to misrepresent power or resolve, war is supposed to serve as a learning process and allows parties to reach a mutually preferable bargain. We explore crisis bargaining under a third type of uncertainty: the extent to which one side wishes to conquer the other. With incomplete information and take-it-or-leave-it negotiations, this type of uncertainty is isomorphic to incomplete information about the probability of victory. However, with incomplete information and bargaining while fighting, standard convergence results fail: types fail to fully separate because there is no differential cost for delay. Wars correspondingly last longer while benefiting no one. These results help explain empirical differences between territorial versus nonterritorial conflicts and interstate versus intrastate wars
Bargaining power · Complete information · Convergence (economics · Differential (mechanical device · Economic growth · Economics · Incentive · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · Process (computing · Victory · Computer Science · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
Rebel Group Protection Rackets
Rational Quagmires
Endogenous military strategy and crisis bargaining
Costly signaling in autocracy
Shifting power, interstate war, and domestic politics
Political and economic protests in authoritarian regimes
Coalition Politics and War Termination
Fanatical Peace
Negotiating Difficult Issues with Little Fervour? Why Peace Processes in Territorial Conflicts Tend to Produce Incomplete Outcomes
Power transfers, military uncertainty, and war
Policy bargaining and militarized conflict
Militarized Disputes, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure
Stall Wars
The Uncertainty Trade-off
When do natural disasters lead to negotiations in a civil war
The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant
The Causes of War
The Size of Nations
War and Punishment
How Wars End
States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control
The Logic of Political Survival
The Two Germanies Since 1945
Aims, claims, and the bargaining model of war
Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict1
The Final Solution in Bulgaria and Romania
Charting A Course To Conflict
How the Weak Win Wars
Texas Annexation and the Mexican War
After victory
Exploring the Bargaining Model of War
Crisis bargaining, domestic opposition, and tragic wars
When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter
Information, Commitment, and War
Bargaining and the Nature of War
Uncertainty, Salient Stakes, and the Causes of Conventional Arms Races
Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining
Making and Keeping Peace
Rationalist explanations for war
The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement
The Rational Design of International Institutions
The Territorial Integrity Norm
War as a Commitment Problem
Bargaining Failures and Civil War
Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and Resolution
A Bargaining Model of War and Peace
How Initiators End Their Wars
Bargaining and Learning While Fighting
The Turnover Trap
Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining
Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule
Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816-1992
Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others
The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
Opportunity, Willingness, and the Diffusion of War
Does International Law Promote the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes? Evidence from the Study of Territorial Conflicts since 1945
Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
Information, Power, and War
| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,67 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 14 |