Colin Krainin
Biographic Data
| ID | 4380489 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Colin Krainin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Colin |
| FAMILY NAME | Krainin |
| SIGNATURE | KRAININ C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Princeton University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 48 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Divided committees and strategic vagueness
Dyadic Conflict: Elites, Citizens, and War
From the democratic peace to the authoritarian peace to the conflict-prone behavior of democratizing states, empirical evidence shows that regime types influence the decision to go to war. The only way distinct regimes can behave differently in similar circumstances is if they have different tastes for settlements. Moreover, dyadic negotiation is dependent on the regime types of both participants. Here we offer a dyadic theory of conflict where s…
Preventive war and sovereign debt
The preventive motive for war arises because states cannot commit to limit the use of their growing power. This commitment problem can lead to war when there are not enough resources available to compensate the declining state for their expected losses. In this article, we show how capital markets affect preventive war incentives by introducing a profit-maximizing bond market to the canonical bargaining model of war. We find that the nature of th…
Alliance Dynamics in the Shadow of Shifting Power
Alliances are costly to form and to terminate, and yet alliances change frequently. Scholars typically attribute these decisions to static factors, such as the power balance, and retrospective ones, such as past power shifts. We highlight another factor: prospective changes, particularly anticipated military strength shifts. We analyze a three-country bargaining model of alliances and war that incorporates forward-looking power dynamics. The mode…
Rational Quagmires: Attrition, Learning, and War
We argue that asymmetric information can cause long wars. We present a bargaining model of war between unequal opponents: the stronger side (“government”) is uncertain about the strength of the weaker side (“rebels”), which deteriorates during fighting. The model predicts that wars may be lengthy, as fighting alternates with settlement offers. Surprisingly, increasing the government’s commitment ability or reducing uncertainty may make war more l…
Preventive War as a Result of Long-Term Shifts in Power
This paper analyzes a complete information model of preventive war where shifts in the distribution of power play out over an arbitrary number of time periods. This analysis leads to a sufficient condition that implies war under a broader set of conditions than previously shown in the literature. This sufficient condition leads to two substantive implications: (1) preventive war can be caused by relatively slow, but persistent shifts in the distr…
Bargaining with a biased autocrat
This paper presents a specific dynamic extension to the model outlined by Jackson and Morelli (Political bias and war. The American Economic Review 97(4): 1353–1373). In particular, we focus on the implications of a long-lived leader who possesses bias towards or against war that potentially differs from the country (s)he represents. Bargaining and war outcomes are characterized in this environment. We emphasize three results: (1) war sometimes o…
War and Stability in Dynamic International Systems
We present a dynamic, complete-information bargaining model of war with N countries. The analysis of a network with more than two countries significantly generalizes previous work. We consider an environment where a country's military strength varies stochastically over time as a function of endogenous consumption. If countries are sufficiently patient, then war is inevitable and will quickly spread throughout the network. We leverage insights fr…
Multilateral War Bargaining
I build a static, complete information, three-player bargaining model of war. Without dynamics or incomplete information, war is always avoided. However, the threat of war determines the nature of alliances. The model uses a notion of cooperative stability to predict balancing and bandwagoning behavior in alliance formation. Given the assumptions of the model, a stable state always exists. Stronger allies increase the potential for war threats ag…
Preventive War as a Result of Long-Term Shifts in Power
This paper analyzes a complete information model of preventive war where shifts in the distribution of power play out over an arbitrary number of time periods. This analysis leads to a sufficient condition that implies war under a broader set of conditions than previously shown in the literature. This sufficient condition leads to two substantive implications: (1) preventive war can be caused by relatively slow, but persistent shifts in the distr…
War and Stability in Dynamic International Systems
We present a dynamic, complete-information bargaining model of war with N countries. The analysis of a network with more than two countries significantly generalizes previous work. We consider an environment where a country's military strength varies stochastically over time as a function of endogenous consumption. If countries are sufficiently patient, then war is inevitable and will quickly spread throughout the network. We leverage insights fr…
Multilateral War Bargaining
I build a static, complete information, three-player bargaining model of war. Without dynamics or incomplete information, war is always avoided. However, the threat of war determines the nature of alliances. The model uses a notion of cooperative stability to predict balancing and bandwagoning behavior in alliance formation. Given the assumptions of the model, a stable state always exists. Stronger allies increase the potential for war threats ag…
Alliance Dynamics in the Shadow of Shifting Power
Alliances are costly to form and to terminate, and yet alliances change frequently. Scholars typically attribute these decisions to static factors, such as the power balance, and retrospective ones, such as past power shifts. We highlight another factor: prospective changes, particularly anticipated military strength shifts. We analyze a three-country bargaining model of alliances and war that incorporates forward-looking power dynamics. The mode…
Bargaining with a biased autocrat
This paper presents a specific dynamic extension to the model outlined by Jackson and Morelli (Political bias and war. The American Economic Review 97(4): 1353–1373). In particular, we focus on the implications of a long-lived leader who possesses bias towards or against war that potentially differs from the country (s)he represents. Bargaining and war outcomes are characterized in this environment. We emphasize three results: (1) war sometimes o…
Preventive war and sovereign debt
The preventive motive for war arises because states cannot commit to limit the use of their growing power. This commitment problem can lead to war when there are not enough resources available to compensate the declining state for their expected losses. In this article, we show how capital markets affect preventive war incentives by introducing a profit-maximizing bond market to the canonical bargaining model of war. We find that the nature of th…
Dyadic Conflict: Elites, Citizens, and War
From the democratic peace to the authoritarian peace to the conflict-prone behavior of democratizing states, empirical evidence shows that regime types influence the decision to go to war. The only way distinct regimes can behave differently in similar circumstances is if they have different tastes for settlements. Moreover, dyadic negotiation is dependent on the regime types of both participants. Here we offer a dyadic theory of conflict where s…
Rational Quagmires: Attrition, Learning, and War
We argue that asymmetric information can cause long wars. We present a bargaining model of war between unequal opponents: the stronger side (“government”) is uncertain about the strength of the weaker side (“rebels”), which deteriorates during fighting. The model predicts that wars may be lengthy, as fighting alternates with settlement offers. Surprisingly, increasing the government’s commitment ability or reducing uncertainty may make war more l…
Multilateral War Bargaining
I build a static, complete information, three-player bargaining model of war. Without dynamics or incomplete information, war is always avoided. However, the threat of war determines the nature of alliances. The model uses a notion of cooperative stability to predict balancing and bandwagoning behavior in alliance formation. Given the assumptions of the model, a stable state always exists. Stronger allies increase the potential for war threats ag…
War and Stability in Dynamic International Systems
We present a dynamic, complete-information bargaining model of war with N countries. The analysis of a network with more than two countries significantly generalizes previous work. We consider an environment where a country's military strength varies stochastically over time as a function of endogenous consumption. If countries are sufficiently patient, then war is inevitable and will quickly spread throughout the network. We leverage insights fr…
Preventive War as a Result of Long-Term Shifts in Power
This paper analyzes a complete information model of preventive war where shifts in the distribution of power play out over an arbitrary number of time periods. This analysis leads to a sufficient condition that implies war under a broader set of conditions than previously shown in the literature. This sufficient condition leads to two substantive implications: (1) preventive war can be caused by relatively slow, but persistent shifts in the distr…
Bargaining with a biased autocrat
This paper presents a specific dynamic extension to the model outlined by Jackson and Morelli (Political bias and war. The American Economic Review 97(4): 1353–1373). In particular, we focus on the implications of a long-lived leader who possesses bias towards or against war that potentially differs from the country (s)he represents. Bargaining and war outcomes are characterized in this environment. We emphasize three results: (1) war sometimes o…
Rational Quagmires: Attrition, Learning, and War
We argue that asymmetric information can cause long wars. We present a bargaining model of war between unequal opponents: the stronger side (“government”) is uncertain about the strength of the weaker side (“rebels”), which deteriorates during fighting. The model predicts that wars may be lengthy, as fighting alternates with settlement offers. Surprisingly, increasing the government’s commitment ability or reducing uncertainty may make war more l…
Preventive war and sovereign debt
The preventive motive for war arises because states cannot commit to limit the use of their growing power. This commitment problem can lead to war when there are not enough resources available to compensate the declining state for their expected losses. In this article, we show how capital markets affect preventive war incentives by introducing a profit-maximizing bond market to the canonical bargaining model of war. We find that the nature of th…
Alliance Dynamics in the Shadow of Shifting Power
Alliances are costly to form and to terminate, and yet alliances change frequently. Scholars typically attribute these decisions to static factors, such as the power balance, and retrospective ones, such as past power shifts. We highlight another factor: prospective changes, particularly anticipated military strength shifts. We analyze a three-country bargaining model of alliances and war that incorporates forward-looking power dynamics. The mode…
Divided committees and strategic vagueness
Dyadic Conflict: Elites, Citizens, and War
From the democratic peace to the authoritarian peace to the conflict-prone behavior of democratizing states, empirical evidence shows that regime types influence the decision to go to war. The only way distinct regimes can behave differently in similar circumstances is if they have different tastes for settlements. Moreover, dyadic negotiation is dependent on the regime types of both participants. Here we offer a dyadic theory of conflict where s…
Economics (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Law (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (5 works) · Political economy (5 works) · Bargaining power (4 works) · Power (physics (4 works)