Winning with the Bomb

Bibliographic Data

ID6284308
AuthorsKyle Beardsley (0000-0001-9401-3264, Department of Political Science Emory University, Atlanta), Victor Asal (0000-0001-7614-4869, Department of Political Science State University of New York, Albany)
Year2009
Volume53
Issue2
Pages278-301
Publication date2009-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002708330386
OpenAlexW2138337639
LanguageEN
Citations received42
References cited52

Nuclear weapons' effects on an actor's success in coercive diplomacy are in part a function of how nuclear weapons change the perceived costs of conflict. The authors argue that states can improve their allotment of a good or convince an opponent to back down and have shorter crises if their opponents have greater expected costs of crisis. Noting that nuclear weapons increase the costs of full-escalation scenarios but decrease their probability, it is uncertain what impact nuclear weapons should have on expected costs of conflict. The authors assess crisis outcomes from 1945 to 2000 using the International Crisis Behavior data set. The evidence confirms that nuclear actors are more likely to prevail when facing a nonnuclear state. The expected duration of crisis in such asymmetric directed dyads is substantially smaller than the duration of crisis for actors in nonnuclear dyads. Nuclear actors in asymmetric dyads are also more likely to prevail than states in symmetric nuclear dyads

Adversary · Allotment · Computer security · Diplomacy · Economics · International conflict · Market economy · Nuclear warfare · Nuclear weapon · Political economy · Political science · Politics · State (computer science · Computer Science · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

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