North Korea's nuclear gambit

Coercion, deterrence, and the escalation‐de‐escalation paradox

Bibliographic Data

ID6041079
AuthorsEdward Kwon (0000-0003-2099-0374, Northern Kentucky University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume17
Issue1
Publication date2025-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAsian Politics & Policy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1943-0787 • E-ISSN: 1943-0779
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/aspp.70006
OpenAlexW4406597822
LanguageEN
References cited18

North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development and recent nuclear law permitting preemptive nuclear use have jeopardized US and ROK security. Analyzing possible channels of Pyongyang's nuclear brinkmanship and military provocations through international relations theories—including nuclear coercive diplomacy and the nuclear stability‐instability paradox—and the “escalation to de‐escalation” military strategy reveals concerning trends. Pyongyang continues to develop new WMDs and conduct military drills involving tactical nuclear weapons, enhancing Kim Jong Un's adventurous brinkmanship. In response, the United States must adopt a strong nuclear retaliation strategy, expedite its nuclear triad modernization plan, and support an effective South Korean missile defense system. A military contingency plan, and diplomatic efforts to persuade Kim to abandon WMDs are crucial. The United States must take a firm stance against nuclear threats from North Korea, ensuring a robust defense and encouraging denuclearization. This multifaceted approach will help address the security challenges posed by North Korea's nuclear program

Coercion (linguistics · De-escalation · Deterrence (psychology · Economics · Gambit · Law and economics · Mechanics · Physics · Political science · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense · Philosophy

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access