Achieving Minimum Deterrence
A New Dyadic Dataset on Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Capabilities
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071681 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kyungwon Suh (0000-0002-7029-0117, UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, La Jolla, CA, USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 68 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 1017-1045 |
| Publication date | 2023-06-30 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027231187310 |
| OpenAlex | W4382657179 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 45 |
This paper argues that existing quantitative studies mistakenly assume that all nuclear states can impose nuclear destruction on opponents by simply distinguishing nuclear states from non-nuclear states. This practice, however, does not capture variation in 1) nuclear states’ possession of delivery capabilities, 2) the range of deployed nuclear delivery systems, and 3) the geographic distance between nuclear states and their dyadic counterparts. Instead of this monadic nuclear statehood approach, I propose the dyadic nuclear reach approach, which uses a new dyad-specific measure of states’ strategic nuclear delivery capabilities. It codes whether a nuclear state can launch a nuclear strike against a given opponent by using the information about the estimated range of each nuclear state’s strategic nuclear delivery platforms, nuclear operation bases, and states’ capital cities. An empirical application shows that using an appropriate measure of nuclear capabilities does significantly alter existing empirical knowledge of nuclear weapons and international conflict
Business · Computer security · Deterrence theory · International trade · Nuclear force · Nuclear physics · Nuclear strategy · Nuclear weapon · Physics · Political science · Possession (linguistics · Computer Science · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense
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| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2026 (4) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |