An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284248 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bruce Bueno De Mesquita (0000-0001-8582-8330), William H Riker (University of Rochester) |
| Year | 1982 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 283-306 |
| Publication date | 1982-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002782026002005 |
| OpenAlex | W2151969361 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 66 |
| References cited | 10 |
We assume that in a conflict between a nation with a nuclear capability and one without, the conflict may become nuclear, while, in a conflict between two nuclear powers, the conflict is unlikely to become nuclear by reason of fear of retaliation. Then, as the number of nations with nuclear weapons increases, the chance of bilateral conflict becoming nuclear initially increases and then decreases to zero when all nations are nuclearly armed. Empirical evidence suggests that nuclear deterrence does in fact work in the way the model assumes. We set forth an expected utility model for initiating conflict when nuclear weapons are held by both sides, by one side, and by neither side. While there are dangers in proliferation, these dangers may not be as great as dangers of asymmetry in nuclear power
Biology · Deterrence theory · Economics · International conflict · Law and economics · Nuclear ethics · Nuclear force · Nuclear power · Nuclear proliferation · Nuclear weapon · Physics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Set (abstract data type · Computer Science · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense
Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies
Seguridad internacional
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The Grammar of Status Competition
The Evolution of International Security Studies
Deterrence Now
Just and Unjust Proliferation
Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior
A Defensible Defense
The Perils of Proliferation
Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers
Uncertainty as a deterrence strategy
Iran and Iraq as rational crisis actors
The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation
Holding All the Cards
Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests
The Asian Ascent
The Policy Implications of Power Parity
Preventing War by Nuclear Deterrence or by Détente
Nuclear Deterrence Theory
Nuclear Weapons as Shields
Beyond deterrence
Power Transition and Conflict Initiation
Asymmetric Proliferation and Nuclear War
The long‐term stability of deterrence
Classical deterrence theory
Deterrence by mutual assured destruction or strategic defense
Theory and the advancement of knowledge about war
Spreading Temptation
All Mortis, No Rigor
A Model Disagreement
Analysis of the likelihood of quantum computing proliferation
Robust and affordable security
The History of Proliferation Optimism
Arms races and the opportunity for peace
Shadow Wars in the Shadow of the Bomb
Arms Races and Conflict
From Lambs to Lions
Toward a Reformulation of the Theory of Mutual Deterrence
Rigor Mortis or Rigor, More Tests
Managing Nuclear Proliferation
Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System
The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes
Rationality and Deterrence
Nuclear Proliferation and the Use of Nuclear Options
Dealing with Separation in Logistic Regression Models
Nuclear Weapons and the Indo-pakistani Conflict
Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Crisis Escalation
Proliferation and the Probability of War
Social Scientific Analysis of Nuclear Weapons
Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes
What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict
Winning with the Bomb
Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance
Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis
Proliferation, Deterrence, and the Likelihood of Nuclear War
Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict
Conventional Wisdom? The Effect of Nuclear Proliferation on Armed Conflict, 1945-2001
Nukes with Numbers
Neooptimists and the enduring problem of nuclear proliferation
Less is more
Exporting the Bomb
Extended Deterrence, Superpower Control, and Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1962-76
Nuclear Deterrence in the Developing World
A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence
| Unique citing works | 66 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,47 |
| Citation span | 1981 - 2026 (46) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 66 |