Proliferation, Deterrence, and the Likelihood of Nuclear War

Bibliographic Data

ID6283570
AuthorsBruce D Berkowitz (University of Minnesota, corresponding author)
Year1985
Volume29
Issue1
Pages112-136
Publication date1985-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002785029001006
OpenAlexW2115635900
LanguageEN
Citations received13
References cited12

Two arguments have traditionally been made about the effects of proliferation on the likelihood of nuclear war. One argument claims that proliferation increases the likelihood of nuclear war; the other claims that proliferation reduces the likelihood of nuclear war. This article shows that, in fact, both of these arguments are logical and probably true some of the time. The key factor that decides when one argument is more valid than the other is the degree to which nuclear powers can deter other nuclear powers. Because the conditions necessary for stable deterrence can vary systematically, it is possible to define when proliferation is a threat and when it is an asset. Moreover, using these principles, the article analyzes the effect of previous cases of proliferation on the likelihood of war, and shows how a compromise policy for dealing with proliferation can best be determined

Argument (complex analysis · Asset (computer security · Compromise · Computer security · Deterrence theory · Econometrics · Economics · Law and economics · Nuclear proliferation · Nuclear weapon · Political science · Positive economics · Computer Science · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Nuclear Issues and Defense

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