Constituency Size and Support for Trade Liberalization
An Analysis of Foreign Economic Policy Preferences in Congress
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12885331 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sean D Ehrlich (Florida State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 215-232 |
| Publication date | 2009-06-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Foreign Policy Analysis (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1743-8586 • E-ISSN: 1743-8594 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1743-8594.2009.00090.x |
| OpenAlex | W3124960028 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 10 |
| References cited | 36 |
Studies of the political economy of trade frequently rely on the assumption that the larger a policy maker's constituency, the more supportive of free-trade that policy maker will be. Large constituencies are supposed to yield concern for the national interest and provide insulation from particularistic, protectionist interests. This assumption, though, has rarely been directly tested. This article does so by leveraging the variation in district size within the U.S. Congress. This article statistically examines a dataset of roll-call votes on trade legislation from 1994 to 2004 to determine the effect of constituency size and alternative explanations for legislative preferences on foreign economic policy and finds no evidence of the effect of constituency size
Commercial policy · Economics · Free trade · International economics · International trade · Legislation · Legislature · Liberalization · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Protectionism · Variation (astronomy · Yield (engineering · Global trade and economics · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · World Trade Organization Law
Whose China Shock? Partisanship, import exposure, and trade rhetoric in the US Senate
Partisanship, Military Constituencies, and District Competitiveness
Public sensitivity to cultural identity and regime type of trading partners
Constituency Size and Responsiveness to Sectoral Interests
Two-level games and trade cooperation
Protectionist Executives
Who Promotes Protection? Economic and Electoral Influences on Trade-Related Position Taking in the Senate
Does electoral competition affect politicians’ trade policy preferences? Evidence from Japan
When are International Institutions Effective? The Impact of Domestic Veto Players on Compliance with WTO Rulings
Why do legislators rebel on trade agreements? The effect of constituencies’ economic interests
The political economy of U.S. import policy
Politics, pressures and the tariff
American business and public policy
Elements of Econometrics
Empowering Exporters
International Trade and Political Conflict
Black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory
Delegation, Ratification, and U.S. Trade Policy
Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs
Divided Government and U.S.Trade Policy
Divided government and U.S. trade policy
Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929-1976
Diversity in the American States
The Tariff and the Lobbyist
The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy
Dual Nationality Among Latinos
Does Constituency Size Affect Elected Officials' Trade Policy Preferences
Partisanship, Institutions, and Change in American Trade Politics
Political Correlates of Social, Economic, and Religious Diversity in the American States
Let the Chits Fall Where They May? Executive and Constituency Influences on Congressional Voting on Nafta
Quiet Influence
Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations
Conclusion
The state and American trade strategy in the pre-hegemonic era
Access to Protection
Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD
The political economy of nontariff barriers
The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization
Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs
Heterogeneity and Representation
Supplying Trade Reform
Trade and the variety of democratic institutions
| Unique citing works | 10 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,77 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 10 |