Sean D Ehrlich
Biographic Data
| ID | 4153335 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sean D Ehrlich |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sean D |
| FAMILY NAME | Ehrlich |
| SIGNATURE | EHRLICH S D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Florida State University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 314 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Thank You to Reviewers
The Multisided Threat to Free Trade: Protectionism and Fair Trade During Increasing Populism
The standard embedded liberalism argument for increasing free trade after World War II is that countries have compensated those hurt by trade and, therefore, have reduced opposition to free trade policies. This argument relies on opposition to trade being motivated by personal economic effects of trade; however, recent work has increasingly found other motivations for protectionism, calling into question the sustainability of embedded liberalism.…
Lobbying, Access Points, and the Protection of Human Rights in Democracies
Why do some democracies better protect human rights than other democracies? Although research shows that democracies engage in fewer human rights abuses than nondemocracies, we know less about what explains the variation in respect for rights among democracies. Using Access Point Theory, we argue that the number of points of access for interest groups in democracies leads to better protection of physical integrity rights but has weaker or no effe…
Does Compensating the Losers Increase Support for Trade? An Experimental Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis
The political economy of trade literature argues that compensating those who lose from trade is an important component of maintaining public support for free trade, a linkage known as the compensation hypothesis or embedded liberalism thesis. Previous research has found support for many elements of the causal chain underlying embedded liberalism; however, there has been little research on the most crucial element of the causal chain, namely that …
Access PointsAn Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity: An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity
'Access Points' develops a theory about how democratic institutions influence policy outcomes. It argues that the more points of access that institutions provide to interest groups the cheaper lobbying will be and, thus, the more lobbying will occur
Risk Orientation, Risk Exposure, and Policy Opinions: The Case of Free Trade
This research offers a general framework for thinking about how individual disposition towards risk influences public policy opinions. Affinity for or aversion to risk is, in part, a stable personality characteristic that interacts with risk and reward messages in complex policy debates. We examine the implications of this for public opinions about free trade with extensions to immigration policy. We argue and find that opinions about policy depe…
The Fair Trade Challenge to Embedded Liberalism1: The Fair Trade Challenge
The embedded liberalism thesis, a major component of the trade policy literature in political science, argues that governments can build support for free trade by compensating economically those hurt by trade, usually with welfare or education policies. This strategy depends, though, on opposition to trade being driven by employment factors, such as job or income loss because of increased competition. The current fair trade movement raises many n…
Constituency Size and Support for Trade Liberalization: An Analysis of Foreign Economic Policy Preferences in Congress
Studies of the political economy of trade frequently rely on the assumption that the larger a policy maker's constituency, the more supportive of free-trade that policy maker will be. Large constituencies are supposed to yield concern for the national interest and provide insulation from particularistic, protectionist interests. This assumption, though, has rarely been directly tested. This article does so by leveraging the variation in district …
How Common is the Common External Tariff: Domestic Influences on European Union Trade Policy
This article examines the role of national-level politics and economics on the setting of supranational trade policy within the European Union (EU). It argues that, though EU member states must have a uniform tariff schedule, significant variation remains in the average, trade-weighted tariff because each country has a different bundle of imports into each country. Thus, some countries import more high-tariff goods than others. This article argue…
The Tariff and the Lobbyist: Political Institutions, Interest Group Politics, and U.S. Trade Policy
During the twentieth century, the United States shifted from embracing protectionism to being an advocate for global free trade. Scholarly debate has focused on whether this shift was solely because of changes in preferences or if changes to institutions also played a role. Relying upon access point theory, this article argues that an institutional change, delegation to the President, led to endogenous changes in preferences. Delegation makes it …
Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies
Previous institutional explanations of trade policy have focused on the role of proportional representation on the promotion of free trade. This explanation generates numerous unsolved anomalies and provides limited guidance in explaining the difference between proportional representation countries and between majoritarian countries as well as within-country variation in trade policy. This article introduces a more general institutional theory th…
Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis
According to the embedded liberalism thesis, governments committed to free trade provide insurance and other transfers to compensate those who lose economically from expanded trade. The goal of this spending is to maintain public support for trade liberalization. We provide a micro-level test of the critical assumption behind the embedded liberalism thesis that government programs designed to protect individuals harmed by imports reduce oppositio…
Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis
According to the embedded liberalism thesis, governments committed to free trade provide insurance and other transfers to compensate those who lose economically from expanded trade. The goal of this spending is to maintain public support for trade liberalization. We provide a micro-level test of the critical assumption behind the embedded liberalism thesis that government programs designed to protect individuals harmed by imports reduce oppositio…
Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies
Previous institutional explanations of trade policy have focused on the role of proportional representation on the promotion of free trade. This explanation generates numerous unsolved anomalies and provides limited guidance in explaining the difference between proportional representation countries and between majoritarian countries as well as within-country variation in trade policy. This article introduces a more general institutional theory th…
Risk Orientation, Risk Exposure, and Policy Opinions: The Case of Free Trade
This research offers a general framework for thinking about how individual disposition towards risk influences public policy opinions. Affinity for or aversion to risk is, in part, a stable personality characteristic that interacts with risk and reward messages in complex policy debates. We examine the implications of this for public opinions about free trade with extensions to immigration policy. We argue and find that opinions about policy depe…
The Fair Trade Challenge to Embedded Liberalism1: The Fair Trade Challenge
The embedded liberalism thesis, a major component of the trade policy literature in political science, argues that governments can build support for free trade by compensating economically those hurt by trade, usually with welfare or education policies. This strategy depends, though, on opposition to trade being driven by employment factors, such as job or income loss because of increased competition. The current fair trade movement raises many n…
The Tariff and the Lobbyist: Political Institutions, Interest Group Politics, and U.S. Trade Policy
During the twentieth century, the United States shifted from embracing protectionism to being an advocate for global free trade. Scholarly debate has focused on whether this shift was solely because of changes in preferences or if changes to institutions also played a role. Relying upon access point theory, this article argues that an institutional change, delegation to the President, led to endogenous changes in preferences. Delegation makes it …
Does Compensating the Losers Increase Support for Trade? An Experimental Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis
The political economy of trade literature argues that compensating those who lose from trade is an important component of maintaining public support for free trade, a linkage known as the compensation hypothesis or embedded liberalism thesis. Previous research has found support for many elements of the causal chain underlying embedded liberalism; however, there has been little research on the most crucial element of the causal chain, namely that …
How Common is the Common External Tariff: Domestic Influences on European Union Trade Policy
This article examines the role of national-level politics and economics on the setting of supranational trade policy within the European Union (EU). It argues that, though EU member states must have a uniform tariff schedule, significant variation remains in the average, trade-weighted tariff because each country has a different bundle of imports into each country. Thus, some countries import more high-tariff goods than others. This article argue…
Constituency Size and Support for Trade Liberalization: An Analysis of Foreign Economic Policy Preferences in Congress
Studies of the political economy of trade frequently rely on the assumption that the larger a policy maker's constituency, the more supportive of free-trade that policy maker will be. Large constituencies are supposed to yield concern for the national interest and provide insulation from particularistic, protectionist interests. This assumption, though, has rarely been directly tested. This article does so by leveraging the variation in district …
The Multisided Threat to Free Trade: Protectionism and Fair Trade During Increasing Populism
The standard embedded liberalism argument for increasing free trade after World War II is that countries have compensated those hurt by trade and, therefore, have reduced opposition to free trade policies. This argument relies on opposition to trade being motivated by personal economic effects of trade; however, recent work has increasingly found other motivations for protectionism, calling into question the sustainability of embedded liberalism.…
Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis
According to the embedded liberalism thesis, governments committed to free trade provide insurance and other transfers to compensate those who lose economically from expanded trade. The goal of this spending is to maintain public support for trade liberalization. We provide a micro-level test of the critical assumption behind the embedded liberalism thesis that government programs designed to protect individuals harmed by imports reduce oppositio…
Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies
Previous institutional explanations of trade policy have focused on the role of proportional representation on the promotion of free trade. This explanation generates numerous unsolved anomalies and provides limited guidance in explaining the difference between proportional representation countries and between majoritarian countries as well as within-country variation in trade policy. This article introduces a more general institutional theory th…
The Tariff and the Lobbyist: Political Institutions, Interest Group Politics, and U.S. Trade Policy
During the twentieth century, the United States shifted from embracing protectionism to being an advocate for global free trade. Scholarly debate has focused on whether this shift was solely because of changes in preferences or if changes to institutions also played a role. Relying upon access point theory, this article argues that an institutional change, delegation to the President, led to endogenous changes in preferences. Delegation makes it …
Constituency Size and Support for Trade Liberalization: An Analysis of Foreign Economic Policy Preferences in Congress
Studies of the political economy of trade frequently rely on the assumption that the larger a policy maker's constituency, the more supportive of free-trade that policy maker will be. Large constituencies are supposed to yield concern for the national interest and provide insulation from particularistic, protectionist interests. This assumption, though, has rarely been directly tested. This article does so by leveraging the variation in district …
How Common is the Common External Tariff: Domestic Influences on European Union Trade Policy
This article examines the role of national-level politics and economics on the setting of supranational trade policy within the European Union (EU). It argues that, though EU member states must have a uniform tariff schedule, significant variation remains in the average, trade-weighted tariff because each country has a different bundle of imports into each country. Thus, some countries import more high-tariff goods than others. This article argue…
Risk Orientation, Risk Exposure, and Policy Opinions: The Case of Free Trade
This research offers a general framework for thinking about how individual disposition towards risk influences public policy opinions. Affinity for or aversion to risk is, in part, a stable personality characteristic that interacts with risk and reward messages in complex policy debates. We examine the implications of this for public opinions about free trade with extensions to immigration policy. We argue and find that opinions about policy depe…
The Fair Trade Challenge to Embedded Liberalism1: The Fair Trade Challenge
The embedded liberalism thesis, a major component of the trade policy literature in political science, argues that governments can build support for free trade by compensating economically those hurt by trade, usually with welfare or education policies. This strategy depends, though, on opposition to trade being driven by employment factors, such as job or income loss because of increased competition. The current fair trade movement raises many n…
Access PointsAn Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity: An Institutional Theory of Policy Bias and Policy Complexity
'Access Points' develops a theory about how democratic institutions influence policy outcomes. It argues that the more points of access that institutions provide to interest groups the cheaper lobbying will be and, thus, the more lobbying will occur
Does Compensating the Losers Increase Support for Trade? An Experimental Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis
The political economy of trade literature argues that compensating those who lose from trade is an important component of maintaining public support for free trade, a linkage known as the compensation hypothesis or embedded liberalism thesis. Previous research has found support for many elements of the causal chain underlying embedded liberalism; however, there has been little research on the most crucial element of the causal chain, namely that …
The Multisided Threat to Free Trade: Protectionism and Fair Trade During Increasing Populism
The standard embedded liberalism argument for increasing free trade after World War II is that countries have compensated those hurt by trade and, therefore, have reduced opposition to free trade policies. This argument relies on opposition to trade being motivated by personal economic effects of trade; however, recent work has increasingly found other motivations for protectionism, calling into question the sustainability of embedded liberalism.…
Lobbying, Access Points, and the Protection of Human Rights in Democracies
Why do some democracies better protect human rights than other democracies? Although research shows that democracies engage in fewer human rights abuses than nondemocracies, we know less about what explains the variation in respect for rights among democracies. Using Access Point Theory, we argue that the number of points of access for interest groups in democracies leads to better protection of physical integrity rights but has weaker or no effe…
Thank You to Reviewers
Political science (10 works) · Economics (9 works) · Law (9 works) · Law (9 works) · Politics (7 works) · Commercial policy (6 works) · Free trade (6 works) · International trade (6 works) · International economics (5 works) · Political economy (5 works)