Inefficient Cooperation Under Stochastic and Strategic Uncertainty
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285944 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lisa Bruttel (0000-0002-1322-210X, University of Potsdam), Werner Güth (0000-0002-6810-6720, LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, Italy; and Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany), Juri Nithammer (0000-0002-1552-7679, University of Potsdam, corresponding author), Andreas Orland (0000-0001-6954-3669, University of Potsdam) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 4-5 |
| Pages | 755-782 |
| Publication date | 2022-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027211066614 |
| OpenAlex | W4225984051 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 61 |
Stochastic uncertainty can cause coordination problems that may hinder mutually beneficial cooperation. We propose a mechanism of ex-post voluntary transfers designed to circumvent these coordination problems and ask whether it can increase efficiency. To test this transfer mechanism, we implement a controlled laboratory experiment based on a repeated Ultimatum Game with a stochastic endowment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that allowing voluntary transfers does not lead to an efficiency increase. We suggest and analyze two major reasons for this failure: first, stochastic uncertainty forces proposers intending to cooperate to accept high strategic uncertainty, which many proposers avoid; second, many responders behave only incompletely conditionally cooperatively, which hinders cooperation in future periods. JEL-Classification: C78, C92, D74
Ask price · Economics · Endowment · Mechanism (biology · Microeconomics · Political science · Ultimatum game · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
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| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |