Trade Politics Is Local Politics
Subnational Interests and Commercial Policy in Argentina
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6380339 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anthony A Pezzola, Anthony Pezzola (0000-0001-8528-7183, Arizona State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 121-145 |
| Publication date | 2017-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Revista de ciencia política (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0716-1417 • E-ISSN: 0718-090X |
| Publisher | SciELO Agencia Nacional de Investigacion y Desarrollo (ANID) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.4067/s0718-090x2017000100006 |
| OpenAlex | W2785306033 |
| SCIELO_PID | S0718-090X2017000100006 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 27 |
Although it is generally thought that larger industries have greater political influence, by directly measuring the subnational importance of industries, this article suggests that it is the importance of industries within political jurisdictions, not their absolute size, that determines their domestic political leverage.Through the evaluation of Argentina's deviations from Mercosur's common external tariff and from intra-regional free trade, this study evidences that subnational economic interests directly influence Argentina's trade policies.For both large and small industries, their relative importance within the provinces that they inhabit provides the political clout necessary to gain preferential trade policy outcomes
Commercial policy · Economics · International economics · International trade · Leverage (statistics · Political science · Politics · Tariff · Global trade and economics · Global trade, sustainability, and social impact · International Development and Aid · Law
Trading Blocs
Computing Interaction Effects and Standard Errors in Logit and Probit Models
Black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory
Trade Barriers and Trade Flows across Countries and Industries
Bayesian Model Selection in Social Research
Using state-level simulations in a political economy model of US trade policy
Don’t buy from me Argentina
Intraindustry Trade
Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs
Lobbying Legislatures
Rethinking party systems in the third wave of democratization
Does Electoral Accountability Make a Difference? Direct Elections, Career Ambition, and Legislative Performance in the Argentine Senate
Vote-Seeking Incentives and Legislative Representation in Six Presidential Democracies
Trading Blocs
Privileging Industry
From House to Home
Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations
Lobbying as a Private Good with Intra-Industry Trade
Votes and Vetoes
Market Structure, Electoral Institutions, and Trade Policy
Diplomacy and domestic politics
Selection and Influence
Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions
Majoritarian Electoral Systems and Consumer Power
Trade and the variety of democratic institutions
The Political Economy of the Tariff Cycle
Economic Power and Political Influence
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,11 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2017 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |