The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation
Germany and the European Debt Crisis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7820172 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christina J Schneider (0000-0002-0424-186X), Branislav L Slantchev (0000-0003-3404-5242) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-31 |
| Publication date | 2018-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Organization (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8183 • E-ISSN: 1531-5088 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0020818317000406 |
| OpenAlex | W2768289208 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 37 |
| References cited | 34 |
International cooperation can fail even though governments have no distributional conflicts or incentives to free-ride, face no informational or credibility problems, and even agree on the policies that need to be implemented. Germany's refusal to cooperate with the Eurogroup members on the Greek bailout in 2010 until the crisis threatened to derail the entire Eurozone is puzzling in that regard especially because Germany is the main beneficiary of the euro. It was alleged at the time that this was a dilatory tactic designed to postpone a domestically unpopular decision until after crucial regional elections. But why would voters allow themselves to be misled like that? And why did Merkel agree to the bailout before the elections took place? To analyze how citizen preferences affect international cooperation, we develop a game-theoretic model of the four-way interaction between two governments that must coordinate a response to a crisis affecting both countries but who also must face the polls domestically with an electorate that might be uncertain whether a response is necessary. We find that, paradoxically, governments that stand to receive the greatest benefits from international cooperation face the greatest obstacles to implementing the required policies even when voters would want them to. We show how the model can rationalize Merkel's electoral strategy and why her party suffered at the polls when the strategy went off the rails
Bailout · Beneficiary · Business · Conditionality · Credibility · Economic policy · Economics · Face (sociological concept · Financial crisis · Incentive · International economics · Law and economics · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · European Union Policy and Governance · Finance · Law · Social Policy and Reform Studies
We’d rather pay than change the politics of German non-adjustment in the Eurozone crisis
Greek Views of the 2015 Bailout Agreement
Divergent UK responses to Chinese overseas investments
Easier signed than done
The societal foundations of German nation-centred economic policies
Rethinking Tests of the IO Effectiveness Hypothesis
Asymmetry, Hierarchy, and the Ecclesiastes Trap
Overlapping Regionalism and Security Cooperation
Big politics, small money
Responsive voters – how European integration empowers Eurosceptic parties
Strategic interdependence and preferences for debt mutualization in the eurozone
A network model of creditor coordination
Do euro area institutions benefit the small member states
Synchronizing out of gridlock
A new hope for europhiles? The 2017 German federal elections and the revenge of the pro-European mainstream
Credit Claiming in the European Union
Informal organizations over time
Partisan cueing and preferences for fiscal integration in the European Union
Public Commitments as Signals of Responsiveness in the European Union
Crises and Responsiveness
Grand theories of European integration revisited
Do Preliminary References Increase Public Support for European Law? Experimental Evidence from Germany
Change to Stay the Same? German European Preference Formation During the Covid-19 Crisis
Franco-German cooperation and the rescuing of the Eurozone
Analyzing inter-state negotiations in the Eurozone crisis and beyond
Keeping the euro at any cost? Explaining attitudes toward the euro-austerity trade-off in Greece
More ‘Europe’, less Democracy? European integration does not erode satisfaction with democracy
Who Deserves European Solidarity? How Recipient Characteristics Shaped Public Support for International Medical and Financial Aid during Covid-19
Do Shifts in Late-Counted Votes Signal Fraud? Evidence from Bolivia
The Political Economy of Bilateral Bailouts
Is There a Trump Effect? An Experiment on Political Polarization and Audience Costs
Puzzled out? The unsurprising outcomes of the Greek bailout negotiations
Decentralized EU Policy Coordination in Crisis? The Case of Germany
Alliance Participation, Treaty Depth, and Military Spending
Breaking with Orthodoxy? German Fiscal Policy in the Shadow of Covid-19
Framing Unpopular Foreign Policies
Reelection and Renegotiation
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years
Interests, Institutions, and Information
After Hegemony
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2005
Internationalization and Domestic Politics
On the Design of the State
Media and the Economic Crisis of the EU
Incumbent performance and electoral control
Globalizing Electoral Politics
Wider and deeper? Enlargement and integration in the European Union
Negotiating the Single European Act
Survival Analysis and European Union Decision-making
Divergence or convergence? From ever‐growing to ever‐slowing European legislative decision making
Public Support for European Integration
Preferences for International Redistribution
Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems
The party political make-up of EU legislative bodies1
Towards a partisan theory of EU politics
International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints
When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter
Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations
Partisan Heterogeneity and International Cooperation
The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions
Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs
Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending
Diplomacy and domestic politics
The Rational Design of International Institutions
Multilateralism with small and large numbers
Formal Models of International Institutions
Electoral Andpartisancycles Ineconomicpolicies Andoutcomes
Still in democratic deficit
Benchmarking across Borders
| Unique citing works | 37 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,63 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 37 |