Informal organizations over time

Why do member states increase delegation

Bibliographic Data

ID8912290
AuthorsIsabel Rodriguez-Toribio (0000-0001-6508-061X, corresponding author)
Year2024
Publication date2024-12-18
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCooperation and Conflict (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0010-8367 • E-ISSN: 1460-3691
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/00108367241303870
OpenAlexW4405603574
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited53

States are increasingly using informal international organizations (IOs) to pursue agreements in global governance. One of the main advantages of these IOs for member states is that their design constrains the amount of authority that can be delegated to them, thereby reducing sovereignty and reputational costs. However, we continue to have limited knowledge about what happens to the design of informal organizations over time. In this article, I argue that while members strategically limit the authority delegated to an informal IO at the foundational stage, this design preference may change over time. In the context of the global governance of money laundering and terrorism financing, I illustrate my argument by comparing the design of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) at different points over 30 years. Drawing on institutional documents and elite interviews, I show how increased delegation can occur when an informal IO needs unforeseen technical expertise to efficiently handle a policy area affecting powerful members

Business · Delegation · Economic system · Economics · European union · International trade · Member states · Political economy · Political science · European Union Policy and Governance · International Development and Aid · Law · Public Administration · Social Media and Politics

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Open DOIOpen Access