Christina J Schneider
Biographic Data
| ID | 3606255 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christina J Schneider |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christina J |
| FAMILY NAME | Schneider |
| SIGNATURE | SCHNEIDER C J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California San Diego |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0424-186X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 36 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 479 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 36 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 14 |
Climate Shocks, Political Conflict, and the Resilience of Democracies
The world is increasingly experiencing the destabilizing effects of climate change, yet we know surprisingly little about how these dynamics affect the quality and resilience of democratic governance. We argue that climate shocks, through their growing frequency and tendency to compound, trigger cascading economic and social disruptions that place sustained pressure on democratic institutions. When repeated climate-induced disasters overwhelm gov…
International Financial Institutions and the Promotion of Autocratic Resilience
Despite their significant influence on the development trajectories of recipient nations, we know little about the lending strategies of international financial institutions (IFIs) dominated by authoritarian regimes. In this paper, we provide new evidence that autocratic IFIs are not merely neutral economic actors. Our findings suggest that these institutions provide financial support to authoritarian governments facing acute threats to their sur…
A network model of creditor coordination
The End of Autocratic Norm Adaptation? US Retrenchment and Liberal Norms in Illiberal Regimes
In the post–Cold War era, many authoritarian regimes engaged in strategic liberalization in response to international norms promoted by Western powers. As US support for democracy and human rights recedes, will this retreat prompt a global rollback of liberal reforms? While pessimistic accounts predict a return to overt repression, we argue that liberal norm adaptation within autocracies is likely to prove more resilient. We highlight two sources…
Confronting Our Common Enemy
Lazar and Wallace make a compelling case that, although climate disasters undercut democratic legitimacy, "authoritarianism is not the answer." The authors of this essay agree, but do not view regime type as the primary constraint on climate-policy outcomes. Here, the authors draw on research on political institutions and climate policy to highlight two overlooked features of the conversation. First, even if democracy is better on average in addr…
Globalization and Promissory Representation
Despite the centrality of promise keeping to representation, we know little about how it is affected by economic globalization, which is one of the modern world's defining characteristics. We argue that globalization reduces governing parties' ability to keep their campaign promises. We test the empirical implications of our theory with a mixed‐methods approach that combines a large‐n quantitative comparative analysis of pledge fulfillment with a…
Euroscepticism and bargaining success in the European Union
We analyse how Euroscepticism affects the bargaining success of governments in European Union (EU) legislative negotiations. We argue that pro-European governments who face Euroscepticism at home are more successful in the EU. Pro-European governments can use the threat of Euroscepticism to bargain for better outcomes in the Council's informal negotiating environment, with the goal of mitigating electoral losses to Eurosceptic challengers. We tes…
Framing Unpopular Foreign Policies
How can governments implement foreign economic policies that are popular among political elites but unpopular among their voters? Studying international financial rescues, we argue that governments strategically frame policies in an attempt to minimize their expected political costs, which increases their ability to implement those policies successfully. We theorize that framing strategies allow governments to offer financial bailouts, and we tes…
Bridging the Theory-Practice Divide in International Relations
The Political Economy of Bilateral Bailouts
IMF loans during times of financial crisis often occur in conjunction with bilateral financial rescues. These bilateral bailouts are substantial in size and a central component of international cooperation during financial crises. We analyze the political economy of bilateral bailouts and study the trade-offs that potential creditor governments experience when other countries find themselves in financial distress. Creditor governments want to sta…
Donor Rules or Donors Rule? International Institutions and Political Corruption
Political corruption is a massive barrier to economic development and good governance. International institutions have become leaders in the effort to combat the problem. A growing number of such institutions have crafted official anticorruption rules, procedures and policies designed to deter the abuse of power within their membership and within institutional practice. Despite these regulatory developments, little is known about the role these i…
The Company You Keep: International Organizations and the Reputational Effects of Membership
Our contribution to this symposium speaks to the origins of international organization (IO) reputation. The one explored by Daugirdas is agency slack: when people delegated power and authority within an organization—in her example, UN peacekeepers and their surrounding bureaucracy—abuse their privilege and stain the institution's character. We explore another that can spark similar reactions and consequences, but which emanates from the behavior …
Public Commitments as Signals of Responsiveness in the European Union
Intergovernmental organizations play a vital role in democracies. Observers have become concerned about the extent to which government behavior in these organizations is responsive to their national constituents, but they find it difficult to identify responsiveness in these complex and nontransparent environments. This article analyzes how European governments use public commitments in Council negotiations to signal responsiveness to their elect…
Dimensions of input responsiveness in the EU: Actors, Publics, Venues
The European Union (EU) is an unlikely case for responsive policy-making. Yet, in recent years scholars have found that the EU’s overall decision-making output is correlated with the average preferences of the European citizens toward European integration. Despite recognizing the value of this systemic approach, we argue in this contribution that studies of EU responsiveness should explicitly acknowledge the multi-dimensionality of responsiveness…
The Dark Side of Cooperation: International Organizations and Member Corruption
Political corruption is rampant in—and destructive to—many parts of the world. A growing number of international organizations (IOs) claim to address the problem by encouraging good governance norms and rules, such as anti-corruption standards and practices. Whether membership in IOs dampens corruption, however, is unclear. Our central argument is that the characteristics of IO membership determine both whether corruption is tolerated and the ext…
The Politics of Double Delegation in the European Union
Many international organizations channel financial contributions of their member countries through other international organizations to implement their programs and activities. In this context, the second step of the delegation chain is often costly and—at least seemingly—an easily avoidable duplication of a previous one. We examine the puzzling phenomenon of double delegation in the context of European aid. We argue that governments engage in do…
The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation: Germany and the European Debt Crisis
International cooperation can fail even though governments have no distributional conflicts or incentives to free-ride, face no informational or credibility problems, and even agree on the policies that need to be implemented. Germany's refusal to cooperate with the Eurogroup members on the Greek bailout in 2010 until the crisis threatened to derail the entire Eurozone is puzzling in that regard especially because Germany is the main beneficiary …
The Political Economy of Regional Integration
This article reviews and analyzes recent research on regional integration. The review is structured along a political economy framework and proceeds in three steps. After analyzing the development of regional integration agreements (RIAs) from a historical perspective, I first discuss regional integration as a consequence of the decision-making calculus of office-motivated political leaders who find themselves under pressure from different societ…
Foreign Aid and Undeserved Credit Claiming
Politicians in developing countries misuse foreign aid to get reelected by fiscally manipulating foreign aid resources or domestic budgets. Our article suggests another mechanism that does not require politicians to have any control over foreign aid in order to make use of it for electoral purposes: undeserved credit claiming. We analyze the conditions under which local politicians can undeservedly take credit for the receipt of foreign aid and t…
Portfolio Similarity and International Development Aid
How do governments distribute their foreign aid resources across international development organizations (IDO)? We argue that governments’ distributional choices across IDOs derive from their attempt to minimize the costs of delegation and to pursue their own interests in foreign aid policy. Governments make decisions about the allocation of resources across a large number of IDOs, and they delegate their scarce aid resources to IDOs that pursue …
Domestic politics and the widening–deepening trade-off in the European Union
This contribution analyzes the relationship between European Union (EU) enlargement, preference heterogeneity of EU members and co-operation in the EU. I argue that the widening of the EU does not invariably present an obstacle to co-operation. Preference heterogeneity in the Council is not only affected by the accession of new member states, but it also fluctuates over time owing to changes in the domestic political arena. In European countries,…
Partisan Heterogeneity and International Cooperation: The Case of the European Development Fund
This article analyzes the relationship between partisan heterogeneity and cooperation in international organizations. We argue that partisan heterogeneity increases distributional conflict among states during intergovernmental negotiations, thereby increasing the costs of cooperation. This decreases governments’ willingness to contribute to cooperative efforts. We test the theory against data on governments’ financial contributions to the Europea…
Globalizing Electoral Politics: Political Competence and Distributional Bargaining in the European Union
This article analyzes electoral cycles in distributional bargaining in the European Union. The author argues that governments attempt to increase their EU membership benefits above average levels in the preelection period, hoping to appear politically competent to voters. The theory discusses when and how EU members can increase these gains before elections through negotiations in the Council of Ministers. A time-series cross-sectional analysis o…
Interest Coalitions and Multilateral Aid Allocation in the European Union
This paper analyzes multilateral aid allocation in the European Union (EU). We argue that EU members can influence the aid allocation process toward their national interests if they form powerful coalitions that bias the European Commission's development policies. When EU members' preferences over aid allocation are heterogeneous, the Commission can implement multilateral aid according to its programmatic goals. Greater homogeneity of EU members'…
Distributional Conflict Between Powerful States and International Treaty Ratification1: Distributional Conflict
Foreign Aid and Undeserved Credit Claiming
Politicians in developing countries misuse foreign aid to get reelected by fiscally manipulating foreign aid resources or domestic budgets. Our article suggests another mechanism that does not require politicians to have any control over foreign aid in order to make use of it for electoral purposes: undeserved credit claiming. We analyze the conditions under which local politicians can undeservedly take credit for the receipt of foreign aid and t…
Interest Coalitions and Multilateral Aid Allocation in the European Union
This paper analyzes multilateral aid allocation in the European Union (EU). We argue that EU members can influence the aid allocation process toward their national interests if they form powerful coalitions that bias the European Commission's development policies. When EU members' preferences over aid allocation are heterogeneous, the Commission can implement multilateral aid according to its programmatic goals. Greater homogeneity of EU members'…
The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation: Germany and the European Debt Crisis
International cooperation can fail even though governments have no distributional conflicts or incentives to free-ride, face no informational or credibility problems, and even agree on the policies that need to be implemented. Germany's refusal to cooperate with the Eurogroup members on the Greek bailout in 2010 until the crisis threatened to derail the entire Eurozone is puzzling in that regard especially because Germany is the main beneficiary …
Public Commitments as Signals of Responsiveness in the European Union
Intergovernmental organizations play a vital role in democracies. Observers have become concerned about the extent to which government behavior in these organizations is responsive to their national constituents, but they find it difficult to identify responsiveness in these complex and nontransparent environments. This article analyzes how European governments use public commitments in Council negotiations to signal responsiveness to their elect…
Globalizing Electoral Politics: Political Competence and Distributional Bargaining in the European Union
This article analyzes electoral cycles in distributional bargaining in the European Union. The author argues that governments attempt to increase their EU membership benefits above average levels in the preelection period, hoping to appear politically competent to voters. The theory discusses when and how EU members can increase these gains before elections through negotiations in the Council of Ministers. A time-series cross-sectional analysis o…
Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations1: Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power
When and how can weak states increase their bargaining leverage in international organizations? I argue that during phases of routine bargaining, distributional outcomes depend on the states' political and economic leverage and less on the formal allocation rules, so they are unfavorable to weak states. This changes in phases of extraordinary bargaining, which are occasioned by significant reform such as enlargement. States that expect distributi…
Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: Political budget cycles in the West German states
Theories of political budget cycles have been contested because scholars find that incumbents can manipulate deficits in the pre-election period only if fiscal transparency is low. I argue that these findings do not generally rule out the possibility of fiscal electioneering. Governments may increase spending on highly visible policies. The composition of the budget serves as a second-best strategy. It increases political support without strainin…
The analysis of policy convergence, or: How to Chase a Black Cat in a Dark Room
Political science research on policy convergence has largely remained inconclusive. While many studies found support for the convergence hypothesis, an almost equally large number of studies rejected it. Convergence thus could be a less general phenomenon than many theorists believe. This article identifies a second possible explanation. The variance approach, which dominates political science research on policy convergence, is likely to lead to …
The Political Economy of Bilateral Bailouts
IMF loans during times of financial crisis often occur in conjunction with bilateral financial rescues. These bilateral bailouts are substantial in size and a central component of international cooperation during financial crises. We analyze the political economy of bilateral bailouts and study the trade-offs that potential creditor governments experience when other countries find themselves in financial distress. Creditor governments want to sta…
Dimensions of input responsiveness in the EU: Actors, Publics, Venues
The European Union (EU) is an unlikely case for responsive policy-making. Yet, in recent years scholars have found that the EU’s overall decision-making output is correlated with the average preferences of the European citizens toward European integration. Despite recognizing the value of this systemic approach, we argue in this contribution that studies of EU responsiveness should explicitly acknowledge the multi-dimensionality of responsiveness…
Distributional Conflict Between Powerful States and International Treaty Ratification1: Distributional Conflict
Discriminatory European Union Membership and the Redistribution of Enlargement Gains
Conflicts between European Union (EU) members about enlargement result from its redistributive effects. EU members are more likely to suffer from enlargement if they profit from EU transfers and if they are relatively close to applicant countries in which unemployment is significantly higher than in member countries. Phasing in membership rights serves to compensate the relative losers of enlargement to accomplish EU widening. Using data from all…
Portfolio Similarity and International Development Aid
How do governments distribute their foreign aid resources across international development organizations (IDO)? We argue that governments’ distributional choices across IDOs derive from their attempt to minimize the costs of delegation and to pursue their own interests in foreign aid policy. Governments make decisions about the allocation of resources across a large number of IDOs, and they delegate their scarce aid resources to IDOs that pursue …
The Politics of EU Eastern Enlargement: Evidence from a Heckman Selection Model
The eastern enlargement of the European Union is a twofold process, in which governments of transition countries decide whether or not to apply for membership and in turn EU members decide whether or not to accept these applicants. The authors argue that the level of democracy and the extent of market reforms together determine the first decision, while the second decision is largely determined by the EU observing the reform process in applicant …
The Political Economy of Regional Integration
This article reviews and analyzes recent research on regional integration. The review is structured along a political economy framework and proceeds in three steps. After analyzing the development of regional integration agreements (RIAs) from a historical perspective, I first discuss regional integration as a consequence of the decision-making calculus of office-motivated political leaders who find themselves under pressure from different societ…
Partisan Heterogeneity and International Cooperation: The Case of the European Development Fund
This article analyzes the relationship between partisan heterogeneity and cooperation in international organizations. We argue that partisan heterogeneity increases distributional conflict among states during intergovernmental negotiations, thereby increasing the costs of cooperation. This decreases governments’ willingness to contribute to cooperative efforts. We test the theory against data on governments’ financial contributions to the Europea…
Euroscepticism and bargaining success in the European Union
We analyse how Euroscepticism affects the bargaining success of governments in European Union (EU) legislative negotiations. We argue that pro-European governments who face Euroscepticism at home are more successful in the EU. Pro-European governments can use the threat of Euroscepticism to bargain for better outcomes in the Council's informal negotiating environment, with the goal of mitigating electoral losses to Eurosceptic challengers. We tes…
Framing Unpopular Foreign Policies
How can governments implement foreign economic policies that are popular among political elites but unpopular among their voters? Studying international financial rescues, we argue that governments strategically frame policies in an attempt to minimize their expected political costs, which increases their ability to implement those policies successfully. We theorize that framing strategies allow governments to offer financial bailouts, and we tes…
Accession Rules for International Institutions: A Legitimacy-Efficacy Trade-off
Powerful states often accept unanimity voting on accession to international institutions, even though this enables weak states to blackmail powerful states into providing costly side payments. Whereas the literature attributes this choice mainly to efforts to bolster the legitimacy of international institutions, the authors demonstrate that the choice of unanimity also has a strategic component. The authors formally show that unanimous accession …
The Politics of Double Delegation in the European Union
Many international organizations channel financial contributions of their member countries through other international organizations to implement their programs and activities. In this context, the second step of the delegation chain is often costly and—at least seemingly—an easily avoidable duplication of a previous one. We examine the puzzling phenomenon of double delegation in the context of European aid. We argue that governments engage in do…
Enlargement processes and distributional conflicts: The politics of discriminatory membership in the European Union
The Dark Side of Cooperation: International Organizations and Member Corruption
Political corruption is rampant in—and destructive to—many parts of the world. A growing number of international organizations (IOs) claim to address the problem by encouraging good governance norms and rules, such as anti-corruption standards and practices. Whether membership in IOs dampens corruption, however, is unclear. Our central argument is that the characteristics of IO membership determine both whether corruption is tolerated and the ext…
Domestic politics and the widening–deepening trade-off in the European Union
This contribution analyzes the relationship between European Union (EU) enlargement, preference heterogeneity of EU members and co-operation in the EU. I argue that the widening of the EU does not invariably present an obstacle to co-operation. Preference heterogeneity in the Council is not only affected by the accession of new member states, but it also fluctuates over time owing to changes in the domestic political arena. In European countries,…
Too much to die, too little to live: Unemployment, higher education policies and university budgets in Germany
German educational spending per student has dramatically declined since the early 1970s. In this paper, we develop a theory of fiscal opportunism and argue that state governments exploit higher educational policies as an instrument of active labour market policy. By 'opening' universities to the masses and the extensive propagation of broader university enrolment during times of economic distress, state governments have an instrument at their dis…
Abiding by the Vote: Between-Groups Conflict in International Collective Action
We analyze institutional solutions to international cooperation when actors have heterogeneous preferences over the desirability of the action and split into supporters and opponents, all of whom can spend resources toward their preferred outcome. We study how actors can communicate their preferences through voting when they are not bound either by their own vote or the outcome of the collective vote. We identify two organizational types with end…
Differenzierte Mitgliedschaft und die EU-Osterweiterung: Das Beispiel der Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit
Die Arbeit untersucht die Auswirkungen der Vergabe eingeschränkter Mitgliedschaftsrechte auf den Verlauf und die Ergebnisse der EU-Osterweiterung. Die Studie zeigt auf, dass die EU-Mitgliedstaaten Übergangsfristen für die Liberalisierung der Arbeitsmärkte durchsetzten, um die zu erwartenden Erweiterungsgewinne zugunsten der, von der Freizügigkeit negativ betroffenen Altmitglieder - Deutschland, Österreich und Italien - umzuverteilen und so ein Sc…
The Politics of EU Eastern Enlargement: Evidence from a Heckman Selection Model
The eastern enlargement of the European Union is a twofold process, in which governments of transition countries decide whether or not to apply for membership and in turn EU members decide whether or not to accept these applicants. The authors argue that the level of democracy and the extent of market reforms together determine the first decision, while the second decision is largely determined by the EU observing the reform process in applicant …
Politischer Opportunismus und Haushaltsdefizite in den westdeutschen Bundesländern
Enlargement processes and distributional conflicts: The politics of discriminatory membership in the European Union
Discriminatory European Union Membership and the Redistribution of Enlargement Gains
Conflicts between European Union (EU) members about enlargement result from its redistributive effects. EU members are more likely to suffer from enlargement if they profit from EU transfers and if they are relatively close to applicant countries in which unemployment is significantly higher than in member countries. Phasing in membership rights serves to compensate the relative losers of enlargement to accomplish EU widening. Using data from all…
Too much to die, too little to live: Unemployment, higher education policies and university budgets in Germany
German educational spending per student has dramatically declined since the early 1970s. In this paper, we develop a theory of fiscal opportunism and argue that state governments exploit higher educational policies as an instrument of active labour market policy. By 'opening' universities to the masses and the extensive propagation of broader university enrolment during times of economic distress, state governments have an instrument at their dis…
The analysis of policy convergence, or: How to Chase a Black Cat in a Dark Room
Political science research on policy convergence has largely remained inconclusive. While many studies found support for the convergence hypothesis, an almost equally large number of studies rejected it. Convergence thus could be a less general phenomenon than many theorists believe. This article identifies a second possible explanation. The variance approach, which dominates political science research on policy convergence, is likely to lead to …
Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: Political budget cycles in the West German states
Theories of political budget cycles have been contested because scholars find that incumbents can manipulate deficits in the pre-election period only if fiscal transparency is low. I argue that these findings do not generally rule out the possibility of fiscal electioneering. Governments may increase spending on highly visible policies. The composition of the budget serves as a second-best strategy. It increases political support without strainin…
Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power in International Organizations1: Weak States and Institutionalized Bargaining Power
When and how can weak states increase their bargaining leverage in international organizations? I argue that during phases of routine bargaining, distributional outcomes depend on the states' political and economic leverage and less on the formal allocation rules, so they are unfavorable to weak states. This changes in phases of extraordinary bargaining, which are occasioned by significant reform such as enlargement. States that expect distributi…
Accession Rules for International Institutions: A Legitimacy-Efficacy Trade-off
Powerful states often accept unanimity voting on accession to international institutions, even though this enables weak states to blackmail powerful states into providing costly side payments. Whereas the literature attributes this choice mainly to efforts to bolster the legitimacy of international institutions, the authors demonstrate that the choice of unanimity also has a strategic component. The authors formally show that unanimous accession …
Globalizing Electoral Politics: Political Competence and Distributional Bargaining in the European Union
This article analyzes electoral cycles in distributional bargaining in the European Union. The author argues that governments attempt to increase their EU membership benefits above average levels in the preelection period, hoping to appear politically competent to voters. The theory discusses when and how EU members can increase these gains before elections through negotiations in the Council of Ministers. A time-series cross-sectional analysis o…
Interest Coalitions and Multilateral Aid Allocation in the European Union
This paper analyzes multilateral aid allocation in the European Union (EU). We argue that EU members can influence the aid allocation process toward their national interests if they form powerful coalitions that bias the European Commission's development policies. When EU members' preferences over aid allocation are heterogeneous, the Commission can implement multilateral aid according to its programmatic goals. Greater homogeneity of EU members'…
Distributional Conflict Between Powerful States and International Treaty Ratification1: Distributional Conflict
Abiding by the Vote: Between-Groups Conflict in International Collective Action
We analyze institutional solutions to international cooperation when actors have heterogeneous preferences over the desirability of the action and split into supporters and opponents, all of whom can spend resources toward their preferred outcome. We study how actors can communicate their preferences through voting when they are not bound either by their own vote or the outcome of the collective vote. We identify two organizational types with end…
Domestic politics and the widening–deepening trade-off in the European Union
This contribution analyzes the relationship between European Union (EU) enlargement, preference heterogeneity of EU members and co-operation in the EU. I argue that the widening of the EU does not invariably present an obstacle to co-operation. Preference heterogeneity in the Council is not only affected by the accession of new member states, but it also fluctuates over time owing to changes in the domestic political arena. In European countries,…
Partisan Heterogeneity and International Cooperation: The Case of the European Development Fund
This article analyzes the relationship between partisan heterogeneity and cooperation in international organizations. We argue that partisan heterogeneity increases distributional conflict among states during intergovernmental negotiations, thereby increasing the costs of cooperation. This decreases governments’ willingness to contribute to cooperative efforts. We test the theory against data on governments’ financial contributions to the Europea…
Portfolio Similarity and International Development Aid
How do governments distribute their foreign aid resources across international development organizations (IDO)? We argue that governments’ distributional choices across IDOs derive from their attempt to minimize the costs of delegation and to pursue their own interests in foreign aid policy. Governments make decisions about the allocation of resources across a large number of IDOs, and they delegate their scarce aid resources to IDOs that pursue …
The Political Economy of Regional Integration
This article reviews and analyzes recent research on regional integration. The review is structured along a political economy framework and proceeds in three steps. After analyzing the development of regional integration agreements (RIAs) from a historical perspective, I first discuss regional integration as a consequence of the decision-making calculus of office-motivated political leaders who find themselves under pressure from different societ…
Foreign Aid and Undeserved Credit Claiming
Politicians in developing countries misuse foreign aid to get reelected by fiscally manipulating foreign aid resources or domestic budgets. Our article suggests another mechanism that does not require politicians to have any control over foreign aid in order to make use of it for electoral purposes: undeserved credit claiming. We analyze the conditions under which local politicians can undeservedly take credit for the receipt of foreign aid and t…
The Politics of Double Delegation in the European Union
Many international organizations channel financial contributions of their member countries through other international organizations to implement their programs and activities. In this context, the second step of the delegation chain is often costly and—at least seemingly—an easily avoidable duplication of a previous one. We examine the puzzling phenomenon of double delegation in the context of European aid. We argue that governments engage in do…
The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation: Germany and the European Debt Crisis
International cooperation can fail even though governments have no distributional conflicts or incentives to free-ride, face no informational or credibility problems, and even agree on the policies that need to be implemented. Germany's refusal to cooperate with the Eurogroup members on the Greek bailout in 2010 until the crisis threatened to derail the entire Eurozone is puzzling in that regard especially because Germany is the main beneficiary …
Donor Rules or Donors Rule? International Institutions and Political Corruption
Political corruption is a massive barrier to economic development and good governance. International institutions have become leaders in the effort to combat the problem. A growing number of such institutions have crafted official anticorruption rules, procedures and policies designed to deter the abuse of power within their membership and within institutional practice. Despite these regulatory developments, little is known about the role these i…
The Company You Keep: International Organizations and the Reputational Effects of Membership
Our contribution to this symposium speaks to the origins of international organization (IO) reputation. The one explored by Daugirdas is agency slack: when people delegated power and authority within an organization—in her example, UN peacekeepers and their surrounding bureaucracy—abuse their privilege and stain the institution's character. We explore another that can spark similar reactions and consequences, but which emanates from the behavior …
Public Commitments as Signals of Responsiveness in the European Union
Intergovernmental organizations play a vital role in democracies. Observers have become concerned about the extent to which government behavior in these organizations is responsive to their national constituents, but they find it difficult to identify responsiveness in these complex and nontransparent environments. This article analyzes how European governments use public commitments in Council negotiations to signal responsiveness to their elect…
Dimensions of input responsiveness in the EU: Actors, Publics, Venues
The European Union (EU) is an unlikely case for responsive policy-making. Yet, in recent years scholars have found that the EU’s overall decision-making output is correlated with the average preferences of the European citizens toward European integration. Despite recognizing the value of this systemic approach, we argue in this contribution that studies of EU responsiveness should explicitly acknowledge the multi-dimensionality of responsiveness…
Political science (29 works) · Economics (27 works) · Politics (24 works) · Law (23 works) · Law (20 works) · European Union Policy and Governance (15 works) · International Development and Aid (13 works) · European union (12 works) · International trade (12 works) · Political economy (12 works)