The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284940 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Fiona Mcgillivray (New York University), Alastair Smith (0000-0002-5291-1442, New York University) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 639-660 |
| Publication date | 2005-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002705279478 |
| OpenAlex | W2137044224 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 18 |
| References cited | 83 |
In the context of a noisy, continuous-choice prisoner's dilemma, the authors examine how leadership turnover and domestic institutions affect the depth and reliability of cooperative agreement that can be enforced between states through the use of leader-specific punishment strategies. If foreign nations target punishments against leaders observed to cheat on cooperative arrangements (i.e., they refuse any future cooperation as long as the responsible incumbent remains in office), then citizens remove leaders caught cheating, providing the cost of doing so is less than the value of the cooperation foregone. For leaders whoare easily replaced, being caught cheating cost them their job. Since cheating jeopardizes their tenure, such leaders can credibly commit to deeper and more reliable cooperation. The authors derive hypotheses about the patterns of cooperation and leadership turnover predicted under different institutional arrangements
Affect (linguistics · Business · Cheating · Commit · Context (archaeology · Dilemma · Economics · Political science · Public relations · Punishment (psychology · Value (mathematics · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · International Development and Aid · Psychology · Social Psychology
Beyond Hedging
Leadership turnover, winning coalition size and foreign policy realignment
The contagion of democracy through international networks
How do Iranians and U.S. Citizens Perceive Each Other
Public Opinion and Foreign Aid
International Constraints, Political Turnover, and Voting Consistency in the United Nations General Assembly
Introduction to special issue
Presidential hawkishness, domestic popularity, and diplomatic normalization
The Dynamics of Enlargement in International Organizations
Political turnover, regime type, and investment behavior
Credibility in Compliance and Punishment
Bargaining with a biased autocrat
Leader Turnover, Institutions, and Voting at the UN General Assembly
Leadership Turnover and the Durability of International Trade Commitments
Domestic Explanations of International Relations
Political survival, policy distribution, and alliance formation
Introducing Regular Turnover Details, 1960-2015
Domestic uncertainty, third-party resolve, and international conflict
Triangulating Peace
War and Punishment
Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
Multiparty Government
Optimal Imperfection?
The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
Multilateralism matters
Neorealism and neoliberalism
Interests, Institutions, and Information
Cooperation under Anarchy
Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies
Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies
Strategic Politicians, Institutions, and Foreign Policy
The Logic of Political Survival
When in Doubt
Anarchy, egoism, and third images
International regimes
Allies, adversaries and international trade
Credibility, Costs, and Institutions
Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy
International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations
The Kantian Peace
Democratic Trading Partners
A Proportional Hazard Model of Leadership Duration
The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment
Simulating International Cooperation under Uncertainty
Looking for Audience Costs
Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions
Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations
Nice Strategies in a World of Relative Gains
Honest Threats
How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
The Study of Interdependence and Conflict
Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation
Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Causes of Peace
Bilateral Import, Export, and Conflict/Cooperation Simultaneity
Democratic Convergence and Free Trade
Does Democracy Promote Interstate Cooperation? Lessons from the Mercosur Region
The Classical Liberals Were Right
Reciprocity in Superpower Relations
Clear and Clean
Democratic states and commitment in international relations
Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War
Modeling the forms of international cooperation
Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation
The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations Between States
Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements
Squaring the Circle
Toward a theoretical explanation of premature cabinet termination
Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs
The Process of Cabinet Dissolution
In Good Times and Bad
Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce
Cabinet Survival and Competing Risks
Domestic Political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and International Cooperation
International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders
International Trade, Political Conflict/Cooperation, and Granger Causality
Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders
Reciprocity in international relations
War and the Survival of Political Leaders
Bilateral Trade and Political Conflict/Cooperation
Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications
Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises
Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory
International Crises and Domestic Politics
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace
The Political Determinants of International Trade
Political Regimes and International Trade
Free to Trade
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
| Unique citing works | 18 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,9 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2026 (21) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 17 |