Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory

Bibliographic Data

ID3468952
AuthorsWilliam A Galston (University of Maryland, College Park, corresponding author)
Year1999
Volume93
Issue4
Pages769-778
Publication date1999-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2586111
OpenAlexW2114498475
LanguageEN
Citations received29
References cited29

Building on suggestions by Isaiah Berlin, a number of thinkers have elaborated a moral theory of value pluralism. Berlin himself believed that value pluralism was consistent with liberalism, which he understood as a political theory giving great weight to the value of negative liberty. Theorists led by John Gray have argued, however, that Berlin's pluralist stance toward values is not consistent with his commitment to liberalism. Gray's critique has triggered a wide-ranging theoretical debate, and the purpose of this article is to assess that debate. I sketch the essentials of value pluralism and explore its implications for liberal political theory. I conclude that Gray's argument modifies our understanding of liberal democracy but does not drive a wedge between value pluralism and liberal democratic theory. Nevertheless, it underscores the importance of prudence and attention to specific circumstances when using liberal democratic norms to guide the reform of illiberal institutions

Classical liberalism · Democracy · Democratic Theory · Economics · Epistemology · Ideal theory · Law and economics · Liberal democracy · Liberalism · Negative liberty · Pluralism (philosophy · Political philosophy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Prudence · Sketch · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Value pluralism · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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