Political survival, policy distribution, and alliance formation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3918346 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Anessa L Kimball (0000-0002-8766-9561, Université Laval, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 407-419 |
| Publication date | 2010-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343310368346 |
| OpenAlex | W2031436009 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 30 |
| References cited | 60 |
Existing work cannot explain why countries form alliances when direct security threats are not a key political issue, though we know countries routinely do engage in that behavior. Countries form alliances to manage the essential problem that they must use finite budget resources to provide social policy and national security; the 'guns versus butter' dilemma. States ally to 'contract out' national security via the formation of alliance contracts so they can allocate more resources to domestic concerns. Alliances increase the efficiency of security policy by providing the same level of security with fewer resources, thus freeing those resources for use in other domains. Not only should alliances form when security threats do not dominate the political agenda, but also domestic political and economic demands will influence alliance decisions. In positing a domestic politics-based explanation for alliance formation, this article argues that increased demands for social policy goods increase the chances of alliance formation as leaders seek greater policy allocation efficiency. The use of a production possibilities frontier illustrates the central argument. Those claims are examined on a sample of all country-years from 1816-2000 using a probit model. Empirical results suggest changes in the demand for social policy goods, operationalized as changes in the infant mortality rate, are an important cause of alliance behavior
Alliance · Argument (complex analysis) · Business · Economics · National security · Operationalization · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Social Policy and Reform Studies
What Makes Isaf S/tick
Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics
What kind of ‘world order’? An artificial neural networks approach to intensive data mining
Critical Junctures, Developmental Pathways, and Incremental Change in Security Institutions
Regions of Hierarchy and Security
Survival Politics
The inefficiency of EU leverage in Serbia during the Russia-Ukraine war
The Localized and Spatial Effects of US Troop Deployments on Host-State Defense Spending
Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations 1
Deliberative institutional design and US defence and security agreements
Home market power and host market protection of foreign investment
Revolutionary Pathways
The Effect of Age Structure on the Abrogation of Military Alliances
Institutionalized Defense Cooperation and Regime Security
Complementarity in alliances
The economic effects of winning coalition size on the aid‐growth nexus
Foreign Aid, Winning Coalitions, and Economic Growth
Minding the Gaps
National Leaders, Political Security, and the Formation of Military Coalitions
US Patronage, State Capacity, and Civil Conflict
The Bar Fight Theory of International Conflict
Domestic Signaling of Commitment Credibility
Alliance Participation, Treaty Depth, and Military Spending
External Threat and Alliance Formation
Tightening the Belt
Beyond the “Sinew of War
Arms versus Democratic Allies
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Economics of Alliances
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The Logic of Political Survival
An Economic Theory of Alliances
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Alliance Politics during the Cold War
Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944
Substitutes or complements
Eugene
Patterns and determinants of infant mortality in developed nations, 1950–1975
Colluding victims
People vs. Malthus
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Theory of international politics
Explaining Third World Alignment
Jumping on the Bandwagon
The Path(s) to Rivalry
Alliance Formation and War Behavior
Reevaluating Alliance Reliability
To Protect and to Serve
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The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation
Birds of a Feather
Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances, 1816-1992
The Costs of Reneging
Defense Expenditures, Economic Growth, and The “Peace Dividend
Political System Similarity And The Choice of Allies
Diplomacy and domestic politics
The second image reversed
Domestic sources of alliances and alignments
Arms versus allies
Chain gangs and passed bucks
The Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution
Guns versus Butter
Consolidating South African Democracy
A New Dataset on Infant Mortality Rates, 1816-2002
Measuring Alliances
Alliance Formation and Conflict Initiation
Relational Exchange
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace
The Decision to Ally
Welfare State and Infant Mortality
| Unique citing works | 30 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,14 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2026 (15) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 29 |