National Leaders, Political Security, and the Formation of Military Coalitions

Bibliographic Data

ID7301904
AuthorsScott Wolford (0000-0002-5468-6699, The University of Texas at Austin), Emily Hencken Ritter (0000-0003-3224-8935, University of California, Merced)
Year2016
Volume60
Issue3
Pages540-551
Publication date2016-02-19
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/isq/sqv023
OpenAlexW2318899508
LanguageEN
Citations received22
References cited52

States frequently form military coalitions, and these collaborations matter a great deal for international politics, yet their origins are poorly understood. Building coalitions in international crises improves military prospects. At the same time, it requires policy concessions to compensate partners. We show that a national leader’s job security affects her willingness to make this tradeoff. First, politically insecure leaders are more willing to form coalitions than secure leaders. The former face greater incentives to accept tradeoffs in order to bolster their chances of victory and thereby improve their chances of remaining in power. Second, politically insecure leaders are also less selective in their choice of partners. Their willingness to make larger policy concessions leads them to form coalitions with states of increasingly divergent foreign policy preferences. A sample of crises from 1951-1999 provides statistical support for these arguments

Economics · Face (sociological concept · Foreign policy · Incentive · Market economy · National security · Order (exchange · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Sociology · Victory · Finance · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

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