Knowing the Unknown

Executive Evaluation and International Crisis Outcomes

Bibliographic Data

ID6286089
AuthorsLeslie Johns (0000-0002-9524-917X, New York University, corresponding author)
Year2006
Volume50
Issue2
Pages228-252
Publication date2006-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002705284825
OpenAlexW2053419135
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited29

When voters evaluate their executive's policies, they often possess information that was previously unknownto policy makers. Should voters use such ex post information? The author presents a model of executive evaluation following an international crisis. Using ex post information can be welfare enhancing for the voter when contrasted with naive retrospection, in which voters compare pre- and postconflict utility. However, the welfare implications of using ex post information are not clear-cut when contrasted to sophisticated retrospective voting. While the latter voting rule leads to situations in which an executive is overly aggressive in crises, using ex post information can induce executive behavior that is insufficiently aggressive. Voters must balance the relative desirability of unwanted wars against unwanted passivity when deciding how to evaluate leaders. In opening up the black box of domestic politics, assumptions about voter behavior can affect substantive and normative findings

Balance (ability · Economics · Executive branch · Executive summary · Normative · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Voting · Welfare · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub