Equilibrium Behavior in Crisis Bargaining Games
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231899 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jeffrey S Banks (University of Rochester, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 599 |
| Publication date | 1990-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2111390 |
| OpenAlex | W1981550176 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 73 |
| References cited | 7 |
This paper analyzes a general model of two-player bargaining in the shadow of war, where one \nplayer possesses private information concerning the expected benefits of war. I derive conclusions \nabout equilibrium behavior by examining incentive compatibility constraints, where these constraints \nhold regardless of the game form; hence, the qualitative results are "game-free." I show that the \nhigher the informed player's payoff from war, the higher is his or her equilibrium payoff from settling \nthe dispute short of war, and the higher is the equilibrium probability of war. The latter result rationalizes \nthe monotonicity assumption prevalent in numerous expected utility models of war. I then \nprovide a general result concerning the equilibrium relationship between settlement payoffs and the \nprobability of war
Bargaining problem · Computer security · Economics · Incentive · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Private information retrieval · Spanish Civil War · Stochastic game · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Game Theory, Diplomatic History and Security Studies
Military Threats
A General Explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Signaling Difficulties with Linkage in Crisis Bargaining
Designing Checks and Balances
International Negotiation
Veto players, policy change, and institutional design
Domestic constraints in crisis bargaining
How uncertainty about outside options impedes international cooperation
How the scope of a demand conveys resolve
Diversionary Incentives, Rally Effects, and Crisis Bargaining
Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War
Turkey and the West
Why do opposition parties boycott elections
Commitment problems and Russia's invasion of Ukraine
The Political Future of Afghanistan and Its Implications for US Policy
The Next Wave
Protest, counter-protest and organizational diversification of protest groups
The success and use of economic sanctions
Selection Effects and Deterrence
Competing interests and technology policies
Asymmetry, Parity, and (Civil) War
Strategic ambiguity about military capacity with multiple adversaries
Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts
Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies
Uncertainty in crisis bargaining with multiple policy options
Uncertainty and the role of the pawn in extended deterrence
Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process
Do States Play Signaling Games
Cheap Talk Diplomacy, Voluntary Negotiations, and Variable Bargaining Power1
Presidential Responses to Foreign Policy Crises
National Leaders, Political Security, and the Formation of Military Coalitions
Pride of Place
A Unified Model of War Onset and Outcome
The Strategic Foundations of Political Sovereignty
Is an Ultimatum the Last Word on Crisis Bargaining
Military Coalitions and the Politics of Information
War with Crazy Types
A duration estimator for a continuous time war of attrition game
Political Bargaining and the Timing of Congressional Appropriations
Political conflicts, the role of opposition parties, and the limits on taxation
Power transfers, military uncertainty, and war
International Relations Theory and Game Theory
Mediation in the shadow of an audience
A Mark in Time Saves Nein
Strengthening International Courts and the Early Settlement of Disputes
War Initiators and War Winners
The Role of Rewards in Conflictual International Interactions
When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter
On Nuclear Superiority and National Security
Assessing the Dispute in the South China Sea
Arms, Intelligence, and War
Sanctions, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure
Analytic Uncertainty and International Cooperation
A Bargaining Theory of Conflict with Evolutionary Preferences
Feigning Weakness
The Rebels’ Credibility Dilemma
The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations
Investing in the Peace
Synthesizing Theories of Authoritarian Elections
Information, Uncertainty, and War
Uncertainty and Incentives in Crisis Bargaining
Prediction, Proxies, and Power
Forecasting the Risks of Nuclear Proliferation
Observing the capitalist peace
Domestic Opposition and Foreign War
Capabilities, Perception, and Escalation
International Crises and Domestic Politics
Military Coercion in Interstate Crises
Probabilistic Causality, Selection Bias, and the Logic of the Democratic Peace
Are Supreme Court Nominations a Move-the-Median Game
Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
| Unique citing works | 73 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,03 |
| Citation span | 1990 - 2026 (37) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 73 |