Political Bargaining and the Timing of Congressional Appropriations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300922 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Woon (0000-0002-2237-5001, University of Pittsburgh 4814 Wesley W. Posvar Hall Pittsburgh PA 15260), Sarah Anderson (0000-0002-8581-1544, University of California 4510 Bren Hall Santa Barbara CA 93106‐5131), Sarah E Anderson (0000-0002-7522-2340, University of California, Santa Barbara) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 409-436 |
| Publication date | 2012-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1939-9162.2012.00056.x |
| OpenAlex | W1841607921 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 22 |
| References cited | 45 |
Although Congress passes spending bills every year, there is great variation in the amount of time it takes. Drawing from rational models of bargaining, we identify factors that systematically affect the duration of legislative bargaining in the appropriations process. Analysis of spending bills for fiscal years 1977 to 2009 shows that delays are shorter when the ideological distance between pairs of key players decreases and distributive content is higher, but they are longer following an election. We find that congressional parties matter but that intraparty conflict matters as well, which suggests that Appropriations Committees retain significant autonomy in Congress
Autonomy · Distributive property · Duration (music · Economics · Ideology · Legislative process · Legislature · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Variation (astronomy · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Social Policy and Reform Studies
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| Unique citing works | 22 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,83 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2025 (12) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 22 |