Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232247 |
|---|---|
| Authors | D Roderick Kiewiet (California Institute of Technology), Mathew D Mccubbins (0000-0003-0606-2109, Duke University) |
| Year | 1988 |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 713 |
| Publication date | 1988-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2111243 |
| OpenAlex | W1636396068 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 83 |
We investigate the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding regular annual appropriations legislation. The most important implication of our analysis is that the influence the veto conveys is asymmetrical: it allows the president to restrain Congress when he prefers to appropriate less to an agency than they do; it does not provide him an effective means of extracting higher appropriations from Congress when he prefers to spend more than they do. This asymmetry derives from Constitutional limitations on the veto, the sequencing of the appropriations process provided by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1920, and the presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure level contained in continuing resolutions (Fanno, 1966). We find strong support for this proposition in a regression of presidential requests upon congressional appropriations decisions
De facto · Legislation · Political science · Politics · Possession (linguistics) · Presidential system · Process (computing) · Veto · Computer Science · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration
The Item Veto's Sting
Money and Majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany
In search of efficacious executive veto authority
Distributive Politics
The New Separation‐of‐Powers Approach to American Politics
The Political Economy of the US Presidency
Setting the Agenda
Agency Design and Distributive Politics
Democracy and the Limits of Self-Government
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-Developed Countries
Effects of the President’s Party on Infant Health Across Racial & Ethnic Groups in the United States
Tall, Grande, or Venti
Presidential‐Congressional Budget Agreement, 1949–1995
State Legislative Influence over Agency Rulemaking
The Trump Administration Versus Human Rights
The politics within institutions for regulating public spending
Mechanisms of Checks and Balances
T he W artime P resident
The Public Presidency, Personal Approval Ratings, and Policy Making
Beyond Pivotal Politics
Presidents and the Congressional Black Caucus
Presidential “Pitches” and White House Pressure
Opportunism in Polarization
Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States
The First- and Second-Nature Geographic Correlates of Federal Budget Transfers and Fiscal Dependence—Evidence from Russia and the United States
Logical Deficiencies in Spatial Models
Agent discretion, regulatory policymaking, and different institutional arrangements
Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock
Circumventing formal structure through commitment
Executive veto power and credit claiming
New Data and New Directions in Interbranch Lobbying
Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers
Sincere Versus Sophisticated Voting in Congress
Toward a Broader Understanding of Presidential Power
Loyal Leaders, Affluent Agencies
Patterns of Representation
Congressional Bargaining in Presidential Time
A Dynamic Model of State Budget Outcomes under Divided Partisan Government
Explaining the President's Issue Based Liberalism
Who Makes Voting Convenient? Explaining the Adoption of Early and No-Excuse Absentee Voting in the American States
Veto Override Requirements and Executive Success
Partisan Presidential Influence over US Federal Budgetary Outcomes
Presidential Success on the Substance of Legislation
Legislative Gender Diversity and the Resolution of Civil Conflict
The Politics of Impoundments
Veto Threat Bargaining with a Bicameral Congress
Measures and Models of Budgetary Policy
Topping Off and Bottoming Out
I’m Not the President of Black America
Political Bargaining and the Timing of Congressional Appropriations
Who Blinks First? Legislative Patience and Bargaining with Governors
How presidents push, when presidents win
A Theory of Presidents' Public Agenda Setting
The Empirical Content of Rational Choice Theory
Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock
Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions
Opinion Representation and Policy Feedback
Models of Vetoes and Veto Bargaining
Congress and Administrative Policymaking
Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries
Looking Back to Move Forward
Interbranch Negotiations over Policies with Multiple Outcomes
Dynamics of Representation
The Hidden Effects of Rules Not Broken
Delaying the Buck
Presidential Persuasive Advantage
Presidential Vision or Congressional Derision? Explaining Budgeting Outcomes for Nasa, 1958–2008
The Presidency and Political Equality
Happy Birthday” and Other Awkward Sentiments
Trump and the Art of Presidential Deal Making
Punctuated Budgets and Governors’ Institutional Powers
The Lifecycle of Public Policy
Legislative Gridlock and Policymaking Through the Appropriations Process
Understanding the Adoption of Voter Identification Laws in the American States
Presidential pork barrel politics with polarized voters
Politicizing Agency Spending Authority
The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending
Presidential Pork
The Strategic Agenda in Legislative Politics
Presidential Particularism and Divide-the-Dollar Politics
Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions
Out of Step, Out of Office
Poder de decreto
| Unique citing works | 83 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,18 |
| Citation span | 1988 - 2025 (38) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 80 |