Congressional Bargaining in Presidential Time
Give and Take, Anticipation, and the Constitutional Rationalization of Dead Ducks
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6387992 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Terry Sullivan (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Scott De Marchi (0000-0003-4355-9800, Duke University) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 73 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 748-763 |
| Publication date | 2011-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Journal of Politics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3816 • E-ISSN: 1468-2508 |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0022381611000430 |
| OpenAlex | W2041916358 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 55 |
This article introduces a simple theory of bargaining between presidents and members of Congress. Although it employs the analytics common to the typical “sequenced” theories, its approach places more emphasis on give and take, on less reliable information about intentions, and on more complex strategic considerations. The formal results highlight a presidential tenure effect, which in turn suggests four empirical expectations. The article then uses a unique empirical opportunity and data to assess and eventually validate expectations suggesting, in turn, that declining presidential tenure has a substantial effect on confidential bargaining, making coalition formation more erratic and costly. The article concludes with a theoretically informed discussion of how growing congressional seniority led to imposing the 20th and 22nd constitutional amendments
Anticipation (artificial intelligence · Economics · Empirical research · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Presidential system · Rationalization (economics · Seniority · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies
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| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,6 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2023 (8) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |