Topping Off and Bottoming Out
Setting Budget Priorities Through Executive Power
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6328148 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christian Breunig (0000-0002-8074-6712), Chris Koski (0000-0002-6475-4229) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 48 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 342-366 |
| Publication date | 2020-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Policy Studies Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0190-292X • E-ISSN: 1541-0072 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/psj.12247 |
| OpenAlex | W2792895444 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 53 |
This article examines the role of the institutional power of executives in public budgeting; specifically, how executives change spending on particular budget items. Leveraging extant theories of the policy process concerning preference expression, attention, and institutions, we argue that executives deepen large cuts and boost large increases in budgetary change. The strictures of the budgetary process force trade‐offs for executives in preference expression such that increases to preferred categories typically require decreases in other categories. Literatures in public policy and political representation suggest that all executives would like to express fiscal preferences, thereby contributing to categorical budget oscillations; however, not all executives are created equal. We employ quantile regression to examine whether the institutional strength of governors determine cuts, stasis, and expansion in spending across all budget functions in the American states between 1985 and 2009. Our model includes a host of political and economic variables found in the literature of fiscal policymaking, such as partisanship and divided government. The desire to change policy may be widely shared across executives, but we find that the ability to “top off” categorical increases and bottom out categorical decreases is a function of an executive's capacity to call attention to preferred categories via agenda‐setting power and to secure those changes via veto power. The findings show strong governors are well positioned to influence public policy through the budgetary process
Budget process · Business · Categorical variable · Economics · Extant taxon · Government (linguistics · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Preference · Public economics · Representation (politics · Veto · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
Quantile Modeling for Political Research
Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Policy Punctuations
The power struggles of executives and legislators in a kingship budget setting
The shape of the budget. European countries’ public expenditure through crises
Four more years! (of policy process research in a Trump administration)
The other side of chaos Covid-19, federal spending, and local government volatility
Political tax cycles in the US states
Budget Structure Discontinuity
Budgeting
Rules and Restraint
Quantile Regression
Managing the President's Program
The Power of American Governors
The Rational Public
Politics in the American States
Fiscal Governance in Europe
Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline
Fiscal Policy, Legislature Size, and Political Parties
Regression Quantiles
Veto Players
Do governors get what they want
Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo
Domestic Budgets in a United Europe
Policy Punctuations
Divided Government and Budget Conflict in the U. S. States
Fiscal Dependency and the State Budget Process
Party and Policy in the States
A Dynamic Model of State Budget Outcomes under Divided Partisan Government
Measuring Gubernatorial Budgetary Power
The Item Veto's Sting
Veto Override Requirements and Executive Success
Partisan Priorities and Public Budgeting
Governors Turn Pro
Do Governors Matter? Budgeting Rules and the Politics of State Policymaking
Apportionment Cycles as Natural Experiments
Stochastic Process Methods with an Application to Budgetary Data
The Tortoise or the Hare? Incrementalism, Punctuations, and Their Consequences
Complexity, Capacity, and Budget Punctuations
Punctuated Equilibria and Budgets in the American States
Who Blinks First? Legislative Patience and Bargaining with Governors
Institutional Constraints on Profligate Politicians
Reduction, Stasis, and Expansion of Budgets in Advanced Democracies
Partisan Politics and Fiscal Policy
Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions
A General Empirical Law of Public Budgets
Punctuated Equilibrium in Comparative Perspective
Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies
Electoral Competition, Legislative Balance, and American State Welfare Policy
Explaining Policy Punctuations
Beyond the Norm
Line-Item Veto
Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits
Bargaining in Legislatures
The Political Economy of State Medicaid Policy
Influences on Executive and Congressional Budgetary Priorities, 1955-1981
Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American States
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,14 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |