Congress and Administrative Policymaking
Identifying Congressional Veto Power
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6231106 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alex Acs (0000-0002-0615-9632, The Ohio State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 513-529 |
| Publication date | 2019-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12444 |
| OpenAlex | W2953495955 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 50 |
The ability of presidents to unilaterally shape administrative policymaking challenges a foundation of congressional power: Rarely can Congress statutorily veto administrative actions over presidential opposition. Consequently, Congress has turned to other means of influence, including the appropriations and oversight processes, although questions remain about the degree to which they have been effective. To investigate, I study a spatial model of administrative policymaking that assumes Congress can execute a legislative veto, as well as a baseline model in which congressional influence requires a coalition with the president. I compare the two models and develop empirical tests that exploit instances when their implications differ. Applying the tests to data on federal regulatory policymaking shows consistent evidence that Congress exerts veto power over administrative activity, even over those actions endorsed by the president. I conclude by discussing some broader implications, including the extent to which existing studies understate the constraints on presidential power
Empirical research · Legislature · Opposition (politics · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Presidential system · Veto · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
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| Unique citing works | 9 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,8 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2025 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 9 |