A Theory of Presidents' Public Agenda Setting

Bibliographic Data

ID6299490
AuthorsBrandice Canes-Wrone (0000-0002-6949-7655, corresponding author)
Year2001
Volume13
Issue2
Pages183-208
Publication date2001-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Theoretical Politics (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0951-6298 • E-ISSN: 1460-3667
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0951692801013002003
OpenAlexW2023966634
LanguageEN
Citations received32
References cited27

We provide a theory that derives conditions under which presidents' ability to increase the salience of an issue will generate legislative influence and correspondingly, conditions under which presidents will engage in this activity of public agenda setting. The theory shows that presidents can obtain influence from not only the act, but also the threat of public agenda setting. However, even when the action is costless, presidents can not always achieve policy goals from it. When a president does not want Congress to become more responsive to public opinion, or when the status quo is not extreme relative to his/her preferred outcome and voters' preferences, the president lacks a policy-based incentive to increase the salience of an issue. These predictions are illustrated with cases involving President Reagan's tax policy negotiations and President Clinton's budget negotiations

Economics · Incentive · Law and economics · Legislature · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Public opinion · Public policy · Salience (neuroscience · Status quo · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration

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