Political Control Versus Expertise
Congressional Choices about Administrative Procedures
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3441275 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kathleen Bawn (0000-0001-7479-4921, University of California, Los Angeles, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1995 |
| Volume | 89 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 62-73 |
| Publication date | 1995-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2083075 |
| OpenAlex | W2034645929 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 241 |
| References cited | 21 |
Congressional choices about administrative procedures affect an agency's political responsiveness and the technical accuracy of its decisions. Legislators would like to design procedures so that agencies make technically sound decisions and balance the needs of competing interests in the way intended. In practice, agency procedures designed to promote technical competence often allow for political drift, and those that promote political control provide little new technical information about the consequences of policy decisions. The trade-off between technical competence and political control is captured in a model of a legislative coalition's decision about agency procedures. The choice variables are the agency's expected preferences and independence. Depending on exogenous levels of technical and political uncertainty, optimal agency procedures can maximize technical competence, maximize political control, or achieve a combination of the two
Agency (philosophy · Business · Competence (human resources · Control (management · Economics · Legislature · Management · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Public relations · Sociology · Auction Theory and Applications · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies
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| Unique citing works | 241 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 7,53 |
| Citation span | 1994 - 2026 (33) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 240 |