Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods

Dados Bibliográficos

ID3407851
AutoresCraig Volden (0000-0003-0046-4510, The Ohio State University), Alan E Wiseman (0000-0003-2993-9188, The Ohio State University)
Ano2007
Volume101
Fascículo1
Páginas79-92
Data de publicação2007-02-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0003055407070037
OpenAlexW2056513288
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas30
Referências citadas28

We develop a bargaining model in which a legislature divides a budget among particularistic and collective goods. By incorporating both private and public goods in a unified model, we uncover nonmonotonic relationships between legislative preferences for collective spending and the amount of the budget actually allocated to collective goods. Put simply, policy proposers can exploit coalition partners' strong preferences for public goods to actually provide fewer public goods in equilibrium while directing more private goods to themselves. These results explain why policy reforms to limit special interest spending often fail. This unified model also sheds new light on when legislatures prefer open or closed amendment rules and when coalitions take different sizes and shapes

Economics · Exploit · Legislature · Microeconomics · Political science · Private good · Public economics · Public good · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization