Fiona Mcgillivray
Biographic Data
| ID | 2264091 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Fiona Mcgillivray |
| GIVEN NAMES | Fiona |
| FAMILY NAME | Mcgillivray |
| SIGNATURE | MCGILLIVRAY F |
| AFFILIATIONS | New York University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 289 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change
Credibility in Compliance and Punishment: Leader Specific Punishments and Credibility
The ability of nation A to compel nation B to grant it concessions depends upon the credibility with which A can commit to punish B for noncompliance. Discarding traditional unitary actor approaches, we assume policy in each nation is set by mortal political leaders and model the compliance/punishment relation between A and B in a noisy infinitely repeated setting. If nations utilize leader specific punishment, that is target policies against lea…
Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism, Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overla…
Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Economic Integration: The Recent Experience
Much of the debate on green growth and environmental governance tends to be general in nature, and is often conceptual or limited to single disciplines.Even though recent discussions on these topics have benefited from the accumulation of empirical and theoretical knowledge over the last few decades, these discussions have not produced the kind of conceptual novelty and tools necessary to place the notion of a green economy within mainstream poli…
The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation
In the context of a noisy, continuous-choice prisoner's dilemma, the authors examine how leadership turnover and domestic institutions affect the depth and reliability of cooperative agreement that can be enforced between states through the use of leader-specific punishment strategies. If foreign nations target punishments against leaders observed to cheat on cooperative arrangements (i.e., they refuse any future cooperation as long as the respon…
Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy
Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions
A theory of sanction duration that focuses on differences between democratic and nondemocratic states in the structure of leaders’ support coalitions is tested, using a hazard model to analyze a data set of 47 sanction events with 272 observations. Results show that leadership change strongly affects the duration of sanctions only in the case of nondemocratic states. Leadership change in democratic states is unrelated to the duration of sanctions…
The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations Between States
We test how domestic political institutions moderate the effect of leadership turnover on relations between states. Deriving hypotheses from recent theoretical work, Bueno de Mesquita et al. and McGillivray and Smith, we examine how leader change affects trading relations between states using dyadic trade data. Consistent with hypotheses, we find that large winning coalition systems, such as democracies, are relatively immune from the vagaries of…
Redistributive Politics and Stock Price Dispersion
Cross-sectional time-series data from fourteen stock markets, from 1973 to 1996, are used to study how political institutions compare in affecting party governments' incentives to enrich one group of industries at the expense of another. Using measures of cross-sectoral variance of price changes within stock markets as a proxy for change in redistributive policy, I show that political change is important in both proportional representation (PR) a…
Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments
Using the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game as a modeling platform, we examine how domestic political institutions affect the ability of nations to trust and cooperate with each other. We propose a strategy, the agent-specific grim trigger, in which national leaders direct punishments for past defections at the leader of the nation responsible rather than at the nation itself. Leaders refuse to cooperate with those leaders who have chea…
Institutional determinants of trade policy
A series of formal models compares how institutions affect the distribution of trade protection. Specifically, we consider how the level of party discipline within majoritarian political systems affects the political incentives for leaders to supply protection to geographically distributed industries. In plurality systems with high party discipline, such as Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, industries concentrated in marginal electoral di…
Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs
Theory: This paper introduces the institutional elements of party behavior as a determinant of the endogenous formation of tariffs. It considers how party discipline affects which industries receive tariff protection from foreign imports. I develop a theoretical framework and generate a set of testable predictions. Hypotheses: Highly disciplined parties in majoritarian systems offer trade policies favorable to voters in marginal districts. At the…
Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments
Using the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game as a modeling platform, we examine how domestic political institutions affect the ability of nations to trust and cooperate with each other. We propose a strategy, the agent-specific grim trigger, in which national leaders direct punishments for past defections at the leader of the nation responsible rather than at the nation itself. Leaders refuse to cooperate with those leaders who have chea…
Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions
A theory of sanction duration that focuses on differences between democratic and nondemocratic states in the structure of leaders’ support coalitions is tested, using a hazard model to analyze a data set of 47 sanction events with 272 observations. Results show that leadership change strongly affects the duration of sanctions only in the case of nondemocratic states. Leadership change in democratic states is unrelated to the duration of sanctions…
Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs
Theory: This paper introduces the institutional elements of party behavior as a determinant of the endogenous formation of tariffs. It considers how party discipline affects which industries receive tariff protection from foreign imports. I develop a theoretical framework and generate a set of testable predictions. Hypotheses: Highly disciplined parties in majoritarian systems offer trade policies favorable to voters in marginal districts. At the…
The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations Between States
We test how domestic political institutions moderate the effect of leadership turnover on relations between states. Deriving hypotheses from recent theoretical work, Bueno de Mesquita et al. and McGillivray and Smith, we examine how leader change affects trading relations between states using dyadic trade data. Consistent with hypotheses, we find that large winning coalition systems, such as democracies, are relatively immune from the vagaries of…
Credibility in Compliance and Punishment: Leader Specific Punishments and Credibility
The ability of nation A to compel nation B to grant it concessions depends upon the credibility with which A can commit to punish B for noncompliance. Discarding traditional unitary actor approaches, we assume policy in each nation is set by mortal political leaders and model the compliance/punishment relation between A and B in a noisy infinitely repeated setting. If nations utilize leader specific punishment, that is target policies against lea…
The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation
In the context of a noisy, continuous-choice prisoner's dilemma, the authors examine how leadership turnover and domestic institutions affect the depth and reliability of cooperative agreement that can be enforced between states through the use of leader-specific punishment strategies. If foreign nations target punishments against leaders observed to cheat on cooperative arrangements (i.e., they refuse any future cooperation as long as the respon…
Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism, Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overla…
Redistributive Politics and Stock Price Dispersion
Cross-sectional time-series data from fourteen stock markets, from 1973 to 1996, are used to study how political institutions compare in affecting party governments' incentives to enrich one group of industries at the expense of another. Using measures of cross-sectoral variance of price changes within stock markets as a proxy for change in redistributive policy, I show that political change is important in both proportional representation (PR) a…
Institutional determinants of trade policy
A series of formal models compares how institutions affect the distribution of trade protection. Specifically, we consider how the level of party discipline within majoritarian political systems affects the political incentives for leaders to supply protection to geographically distributed industries. In plurality systems with high party discipline, such as Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, industries concentrated in marginal electoral di…
Institutional determinants of trade policy
A series of formal models compares how institutions affect the distribution of trade protection. Specifically, we consider how the level of party discipline within majoritarian political systems affects the political incentives for leaders to supply protection to geographically distributed industries. In plurality systems with high party discipline, such as Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, industries concentrated in marginal electoral di…
Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs
Theory: This paper introduces the institutional elements of party behavior as a determinant of the endogenous formation of tariffs. It considers how party discipline affects which industries receive tariff protection from foreign imports. I develop a theoretical framework and generate a set of testable predictions. Hypotheses: Highly disciplined parties in majoritarian systems offer trade policies favorable to voters in marginal districts. At the…
Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments
Using the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game as a modeling platform, we examine how domestic political institutions affect the ability of nations to trust and cooperate with each other. We propose a strategy, the agent-specific grim trigger, in which national leaders direct punishments for past defections at the leader of the nation responsible rather than at the nation itself. Leaders refuse to cooperate with those leaders who have chea…
Redistributive Politics and Stock Price Dispersion
Cross-sectional time-series data from fourteen stock markets, from 1973 to 1996, are used to study how political institutions compare in affecting party governments' incentives to enrich one group of industries at the expense of another. Using measures of cross-sectoral variance of price changes within stock markets as a proxy for change in redistributive policy, I show that political change is important in both proportional representation (PR) a…
Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy
Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions
A theory of sanction duration that focuses on differences between democratic and nondemocratic states in the structure of leaders’ support coalitions is tested, using a hazard model to analyze a data set of 47 sanction events with 272 observations. Results show that leadership change strongly affects the duration of sanctions only in the case of nondemocratic states. Leadership change in democratic states is unrelated to the duration of sanctions…
The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations Between States
We test how domestic political institutions moderate the effect of leadership turnover on relations between states. Deriving hypotheses from recent theoretical work, Bueno de Mesquita et al. and McGillivray and Smith, we examine how leader change affects trading relations between states using dyadic trade data. Consistent with hypotheses, we find that large winning coalition systems, such as democracies, are relatively immune from the vagaries of…
Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism, Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overla…
Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Economic Integration: The Recent Experience
Much of the debate on green growth and environmental governance tends to be general in nature, and is often conceptual or limited to single disciplines.Even though recent discussions on these topics have benefited from the accumulation of empirical and theoretical knowledge over the last few decades, these discussions have not produced the kind of conceptual novelty and tools necessary to place the notion of a green economy within mainstream poli…
The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation
In the context of a noisy, continuous-choice prisoner's dilemma, the authors examine how leadership turnover and domestic institutions affect the depth and reliability of cooperative agreement that can be enforced between states through the use of leader-specific punishment strategies. If foreign nations target punishments against leaders observed to cheat on cooperative arrangements (i.e., they refuse any future cooperation as long as the respon…
Credibility in Compliance and Punishment: Leader Specific Punishments and Credibility
The ability of nation A to compel nation B to grant it concessions depends upon the credibility with which A can commit to punish B for noncompliance. Discarding traditional unitary actor approaches, we assume policy in each nation is set by mortal political leaders and model the compliance/punishment relation between A and B in a noisy infinitely repeated setting. If nations utilize leader specific punishment, that is target policies against lea…
Punishing the Prince: A Theory of Interstate Relations, Political Institutions, and Leader Change
Political science (10 works) · Economics (9 works) · Politics (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Business (6 works) · Political Conflict and Governance (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Democracy (3 works) · Global trade and economics (3 works)