Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283692 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Bendor (0000-0002-6066-0815, Stanford University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 709-734 |
| Publication date | 1993-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002793037004007 |
| OpenAlex | W2167421295 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 23 |
| References cited | 12 |
It is well known that inferential errors can induce nice but provocable strategies to engage in vendettas with each other. It is therefore generally believed that imperfect monitoring reduces the payoffs of such strategies and impairs the evolution of cooperation. The current literature, however, only scrutinizes specific strategies, either analytically or in particular tournaments. This article examines in a more general way how monitoring uncertainty affects the fate of cooperation in tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD). The first set of results shows that imperfect monitoring does create a sharp trade-off between cooperativeness and unexploitability. The second set examines how random shocks affect the tournament payoffs of several large classes of strategies in the IPD, and shows how noise can help certain nice strategies. The third set analyzes how imperfect monitoring can facilitate the emergence of cooperation based on a population of non-nice strategies. Thus the idea that inferential uncertainty always harms nice strategies and always impairs the evolution of cooperation must be sharply qualified
Cooperativeness · Dilemma · Economics · Game theory · Imperfect · Iterated function · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Nice · Population · Prisoner's dilemma · Set (abstract data type · Sociology · Stochastic game · Computer Science · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Psychology · Social Psychology
Collective action in culturally similar and dissimilar groups
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective
Reciprocity
Beyond Reciprocity
The Complexity of Cooperation
Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
The fragility of cooperation
Natural Selection and Social Learning in Prisoner's Dilemma
The benefits of empathy
The Road to Reelection Is Paved with Good Intentions
Organized Interests' Advocacy Behavior in Alliances
Simulating International Cooperation under Uncertainty
The Impact of Leadership Turnover and Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation
Time Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal Choice
How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Asymmetric Power Among Agents and the Generation and Maintenance of Cooperation in International Relations
Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific Punishments
The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations Between States
Elite Agency and Governance in Changing Societies
Identity, Interest and Emergent Rationality
The market dynamics of socially embedded trading
Cooperation Under Uncertainty
The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation
| Unique citing works | 23 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,74 |
| Citation span | 1995 - 2024 (30) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 22 |