Time Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal Choice
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6284449 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Philip Streich (Department of Political Science Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey), Jack S Levy (0000-0003-3278-9088, Department of Political Science Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 199-226 |
| Publication date | 2007-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002706298133 |
| OpenAlex | W2118992575 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 33 |
| References cited | 59 |
Although many decisions involve a stream of payoffs over time, political scientists have given little attention to how actors make the required tradeoffs between present and future payoffs, other than applying the standard exponential discounting model from economics. After summarizing the basic discounting model, we identify some of its leading behavioral anomalies—declining discount rates; preference reversals; higher discount rates for smaller payoffs than for larger payoffs and for gains than for losses; framing effects based on expectations; and a preference for ascending rather than descending sequences. We examine the leading alternative models of discounting and then apply a quasi-hyperbolic discount model to the problem of cooperation in iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games. We demonstrate that if actors display the widely observed tendency to highly discount the immediate future, then cooperation in an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is more difficult than Axelrod suggests
Dilemma · Discounting · Econometrics · Economics · Framing (construction · Game theory · Hyperbolic discounting · Intertemporal choice · Iterated function · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Preference · Prisoner's dilemma · Time preference · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Economic Theory and Institutions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics
Financing the Grand Strategy of Great and Rising Powers
Cognitive Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis
The sources of preventive logic in German decision-making in 1914
Algorithm-associated digital addiction among older adults
Davranışsal İktisat ve Zamanlararası Tercih
Following START
All Options Are on the Table? Time Horizons and the Decision-Making Process in Conflict
Information, Commitment, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905
Foreign Policy in the Fourth Dimension (FP4D)
The Initiation and Spread of the First World War
Do policy packages that mitigate uncertainty over long-term policy benefits increase support for costly climate action
Deter together or deter separately
Preventive War
Bringing Balancing Back In
Speed of retaliation and international cooperation
Timing bombs and the temporal dynamics of Iranian nuclear security
Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve
Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy
Obstruction in parliaments
A Question of Costliness
International Relations and the Psychology of Time Horizons1
The Dark Side of the Future
Preventive War and Democratic Politics
A New Approach for Determining Exchange-Rate Level Preferences
Resolve, Time, and Risk
Long‐term policymaking and politicians' beliefs about voters
Democracy promotion in EU enlargement negotiations
How Political Psychologists Think
Power and International Relations
Conflicts of preferences and domestic constraints
Four Costly Signaling Mechanisms
Politicians' Theories of Voting Behavior
Nonrepresentative Representatives
Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency
Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice
Discounting of Delayed Rewards
Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization
Discount Rates Inferred from Decisions
Doing It Now or Later
Temporal discounting and utility for health and money.
Bidding on the future
Preferences for sequences of outcomes.
Delay-discounting probabilistic rewards
Relative and Absolute Strength of Response as a Function of Frequency of Reinforcement 1, 2
Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
On Second-Best National Saving and Game-Equilibrium Growth
A Note on Measurement of Utility
Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice
Prospect Theory
The evolution of cooperation
Discount rates and credit markets
Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science
Framing Effects in International Relations
Decisions and revisions
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption
Rational choice theory
Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation
Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation
Rewarding Impatience
Psychology and International Relations Theory
Putting time in perspective
The consideration of future consequences
The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders
Neuroeconomics
Specious reward
The Hyperbolic Consumption Model
The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation
| Unique citing works | 33 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,83 |
| Citation span | 2008 - 2026 (19) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 33 |