Bargaining Power in the European Union
An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7972829 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gerald Schneider (0000-0002-0091-6217, University of Konstanz), Daniel Finke (0000-0002-9028-8188, Heidelberg University), Stefanie Bailer (0000-0002-8646-6076, University of Zurich) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 85-103 |
| Publication date | 2010-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Political Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0032-3217 • E-ISSN: 1467-9248 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x |
| OpenAlex | W2010243932 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 59 |
| References cited | 64 |
This article evaluates, by drawing on Barry's distinction between ‘power’ and ‘luck’, the predictive accuracy of competing bargaining models. We explore whether models that take various facets of political power into account predict legislative outcomes more precisely than purely preference-based models like the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Our empirical examination compares how well different formal models predict the outcome of 66 legislative decisions made within the European Union (EU). A model that considers the saliency actors attach to a contested issue performs best among all the models under examination. Although resource-based models provide less accurate forecasts on average, they offer relatively precise point predictions. The analysis also shows that domestic constraints are not a particularly important bargaining resource in legislative decision making
Bargaining power · Bargaining problem · Econometrics · Economics · European union · International trade · Legislature · Luck · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Predictive power · Preference · Economic Policies and Impacts · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
Success and failure in complex collective decision making
Policy Networks
Resolving Controversy in the European Union
Voting power on a graph connected political space with an application to decision-making in the Council of the European Union
Interview-based datasets for quantitative research on the Council of the EU
How the European Union does not work
Member States and Audible Communication within the EU Council Working Groups
In the Shadow of Consensus
Managing technical changes from the scales of legal regulation
The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration
Growing rights consciousness of the marginalised and the reshuffling of the landlord–tenant power relationship
Better together? Explaining Poland’s and Germany’s bargaining success in EU lawmaking
Does implicit voting matter? Coalitional bargaining in the EU legislative process
The Gas Game
Bargaining the Euro
The counterterrorism agreements of Europol with third countries
Real Time, Time Series Forecasting of Inter- and Intra-State Political Conflict
Forecasting in International Relations
A New Model for Predicting Policy Choices
Do votes matter? Voting weights and the success probability of member state requests in the Council of the European Union
Power in the European Union
Challenging the status quo
The cost of unequal integration
Reforming International Institutions
Bicameralism in the European Union
The merits of adding complexity
The European Parliament and economic governance
Suspending vetoes
A new dataset on decision-making in the European Union before and after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (Deuii)
Euroscepticism and bargaining success in the European Union
Domestic-level Parliamentary Scrutiny and Voting Behaviour in the European Parliament
The nexus of bicameralism
Analysing European Union decision-making during the Eurozone crisis with new data
From fringe to front? Assessing the voting influence of the radical right in the European Parliament
Crisis bargaining in the European Union
Measurement, model testing, and legislative influence in the European Union
Analyzing inter-state negotiations in the Eurozone crisis and beyond
Everyone’s a winner (almost)
The contextual nature of lobbying
With a little help from the state
The Power of the Presidency in EU Council Decision-making
Who Is Powerful
Bargaining outcomes and success in EU economic governance reforms
Cheap dates and the delusion of gratification
When parties collide
Do Member States’ permanent representations matter for their bargaining success? Evidence from the EU Council of Ministers
What factors determine bargaining power and success in EU negotiations
Structure, Capacity or Power? Explaining Salience in EU Decision‐Making
Signals to Their Parliaments? Governments’ Use of Votes and Policy Statements in the EU Council
Negotiating Brexit
Underneath the culture of consensus
The temporal dimension of the credibility of EU conditionality and candidate states’ compliance with the acquis communautaire, 1998–2009
Resolving controversies with DEU data
Bargaining power in informal trilogues
Measuring salience in EU legislative politics
Incomplete information and bargaining in the EU
Domestic scrutiny ofEuropean Union politics
Judging Judgment
The oracle or the crowd? Experts versus the stock market in forecasting ceasefire success in the Levant
Party Policy in Modern Democracies
The European Union Decides
Institutions and Social Conflict
National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade
Bargaining Theory with Applications
Methods and Models
European Community Decision Making
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Non-Cooperative Games
Two-Person Cooperative Games
The Bargaining Problem
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
Evaluating political decision-making models
Interests, Institutions, and Information
Perfect Deterrence
Democratic Commitments
The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration
National Interests, State Power, and EU Enlargement
Modeling Compromise at the International Table
Capacity and Concessions
Power and interdependence
The Impossibility of a Preference-Based Power Index
Even More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU
National parliaments and EU Affairs Committees
Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union
The change of tide in political cooperation
Bargaining Success in the European Union
Winners and Losers in the European Union
The institution of ‘consensus’ in the European Union
National Sovereignty and National Power in European Institutions
In View of Ratification
The Contested Council
Is it Better to Be Powerful or Lucky
Is it Better to Be Powerful or Lucky? Part 2
Power Measurement as Sensitivity Analysis
With a little help from the state
When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter
An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism
Diplomacy and domestic politics
Economic interdependence, bargaining power, and political influence
A Priori versus Empirical Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers
Who Is Powerful
The Voting Power Approach
Decision-Making Models, Rigor and New Puzzles
Between Power and Luck
Ignoring the Non-ignorables
Ratifying Maastricht
The Voting Power Approach
In Defence of Voting Power Analysis
Political Regimes and International Trade
Foundations for a Theory of Collective Decisions
| Unique citing works | 59 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,95 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2026 (21) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 58 |