Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Expansion of rebellion

From periphery to heartland

Bibliographic Data

ID10150722
AuthorsK Nakao (0000-0001-9109-2542, University of Hawaii at Hilo, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume52
Issue5
Pages591-606
Publication date2015-06-11
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Peace Research (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0022343315569332
OpenAlexW2741045440
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited51

Why do some rebellions expand gradually as rebel groups challenge in sequence, whereas other rebellions explode instantaneously as rebel groups challenge in unison? To address this question, we develop a dynamic and spatial model of rebellion that illustrates patterns of war fought between a hegemon (government) and its challengers (rebel groups). Our model incorporates three features into the standard coordination game: (a) potential rebel groups (players) are uncertain about the government’s strength; (b) battle outcomes are unpredictable; (c) these groups can be heterogeneous in terms of resolve and strength. In contrast to what existing theories commonly presume, our theory suggests that the sequence and timing of challenges are determined endogenously, depending on rebel groups’ resolve and strength. Through equilibrium analyses, we demonstrate that while simultaneous challenges are likely when rebel groups are relatively homogeneous, sequential challenges may emerge when one group is outstanding in terms of resolve and strength. Once this group rebels, other groups are inclined to ‘bandwagon’ as battles evolve, because the government is gradually revealed to be weak and because accumulated challenges shift the balance of power away from the government. Our theory also addresses why rebellious movements often spread across the periphery and can eventually reach the heartland as if a siege tightens. With an eye to historical incidents, we delineate four patterns of rebellion: (i) snowballing rebellion, which gradually escalates as more challengers are drawn in (Napoleonic Wars); (ii) catalytic rebellion, in which an instigator provokes a galvanizing event to inspire others to challenge the government (Boshin War); (iii) partially coordinated rebellion, which is initiated by a subset of ex post rebel groups (American Civil War, Yugoslav Wars); (iv) fully coordinated rebellion, in which all the rebel groups challenge collectively (American Revolution, Glorious Revolution)

Ancient history · Bandwagon effect · Battle · Government (linguistics · Hegemony · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Siege · Sociology · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Game Theory and Applications · History · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

  • Rationalist Explanations for Two-Front War

    K Nakao•Peace Economics Peace Science and…•2020

  • New Territory, Geographic Diffusion and Civilian Targeting

    Caitriona Dowd•Civil Wars•2024

  • Conflict and defense

    Kenneth Ewart Boulding•Conflict and defense•1962

  • In the Shadow of Power

    Robert Powell•In the Shadow of Power•1999

  • The Causes of War

    Open Access•Geoffrey Blainey•The Causes of War•1988

  • Self-Enforcing Democracy

    James D Fearon•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2011

  • Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective

    Daron Acemoglu, J A Robinson•The Quarterly Journal of Economics•2000

  • A Theory of Political Transitions

    Daron Acemoglu, James A Robinson•American Economic Review•2001

  • Democracy and the Market

    Open Access•Adam Przeworski•Democracy and the Market•1991

  • The Geography of Ethnic Violence

    Monica Duffy Toft•Geography of Ethnic Violence•2010

  • The Napoleonic Empire

    Open Access•Geoffrey Ellis, Geoffrey James Ellis•The Napoleonic Empire•1991

  • Reputation and Civil War

    Open Access•Barbara F Walter•Reputation and Civil War•2009

  • The Logic of Collective Action

    Mancur Olson•Logic of Collective Action•1965

  • Democracy and Redistribution

    Carles Boix•Choice Reviews Online•2005

  • Geography and war

    Paul F Diehl•International Interactions•1991

  • Democratic Ideals and Reality

    John Veit Wilson•International Affairs•1944

  • Why Wars Widen

    Lawrence D Freedman, Lawrence Freedman et al.•Foreign Affairs•2004

  • Dangerous Dyads

    Open Access•Stuart A Bremer•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1992

  • War Expansion and War Outcome

    Open Access•Scott Sigmund Gartner, Randolph M Siverson•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1996

  • How a War Ends

    Open Access•Donald Wittman•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1979

  • Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict

    Open Access•Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gate et al.•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2009

  • To Intervene or Not to Intervene

    Open Access•Alastair Smith•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1996

  • Bargaining and the Nature of War

    Open Access•Alastair Smith, Allan C Stam et al.•Journal of Conflict Resolution•2004

  • So You Say You Want a Revolution

    Open Access•John Ginkel, Alastair Smith•Journal of Conflict Resolution•1999

  • Choosing Sides in Wars

    Michael F Altfeld, Bruce Bueno De Mesquita•International Studies Quarterly•1979

  • Rationalist explanations for war

    Open Access•James D Fearon•International Organization•1995

  • Information, Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede

    Barbara F Walter•International Organization•2006

  • A Bargaining Model of War and Peace

    Darren Filson, Suzanne Werner•American Journal of Political…•2002

  • Building Reputation

    Open Access•Barbara F Walter•American Journal of Political…•2006

  • Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve

    James D Morrow•American Journal of Political…•1989

  • Bargaining and Learning While Fighting

    Open Access•Robert Powell•American Journal of Political…•2004

  • Bargaining and War

    R Harrison Wagner•American Journal of Political…•2000

  • Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War

    Open Access•Branislav L Slantchev, Ahmer Tarar•American Journal of Political…•2011

  • Mutual Optimism and War

    Open Access•Mark Fey, Kristopher W Ramsay et al.•American Journal of Political…•2007

  • Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining

    Open Access•Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham•American Journal of Political…•2013

  • The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty

    Open Access•Barry R Weingast•The Journal of Economic…•2005

  • The Geography of Civil War

    Open Access•Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gate et al.•Journal of Peace Research•2002

  • The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law

    Open Access•Barry R Weingast•American Political Science Review•1997

  • The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome

    Open Access•Karl R De Rouen, David Sobek•Journal of Peace Research•2004

  • Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others

    Open Access•James D Fearon•Journal of Peace Research•2004

  • The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations

    Open Access•Branislav L Slantchev•American Political Science Review•2003

  • Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs

    Open Access•Ethan Bueno De Mesquita•American Political Science Review•2010

  • The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993

    Open Access•Roy Licklider•American Political Science Review•1995

  • Opportunity, Willingness, and the Diffusion of War

    Open Access•Randolph M Siverson, Harvey Starr•American Political Science Review•1990

  • Reputation and Hegemonic Stability

    Open Access•James E Alt, James Ε Alt et al.•American Political Science Review•1988

  • Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action

    Open Access•Edward N Muller, K D Opp et al.•American Political Science Review•1986

  • Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs

    Open Access•Mehdi Shadmehr, Dan Bernhardt•American Political Science Review•2011

  • Threshold Models of Collective Behavior

    Mark Granovetter•American Journal of Sociology•1978

Unique citing works2
Citations per year0,33
Citation span2020 - 2024 (5)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 2

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae