Rationalist Explanations for Two-Front War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21644183 |
|---|---|
| Authors | K Nakao (0000-0001-9109-2542, University of Hawaii at Hilo, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Publication date | 2020-12-09 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Peace Economics Peace Science and Public Policy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1079-2457 • E-ISSN: 1554-8597 |
| Publisher | Walter de Gruyter GmbH (PUBLISHER • DE) |
| DOI | 10.1515/peps-2020-0018 |
| OpenAlex | W3027260579 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 34 |
By extending the extant costly-lottery models of dyadic war to three-party bargaining scenarios, we offer rationalist explanations for two-front war, where a state at the center is fought by two enemies at opposing peripheries. We found that even though private information exists only in one front, war can break out in both fronts. Because the war outcome in one front can affect the outcome in the other through the shift of military balance, a peripheral state may preventively join the war ongoing in the other front to leverage its power (e.g. Napoleonic Wars), or the central state may preemptively initiate war in one front to establish its preponderance in the other (e.g. World War I). These findings echo Waltz’s neorealism concern that a multi-polar system may not be so stable as the bipolar system that bargaining models of dyadic war commonly presume
Alliance · Bargaining power · Economics · Extant taxon · International relations · Physics · Political economy · Political science · Spanish Civil War · Waltz · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Game Theory and Applications · History · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
The First World War
Self-Enforcing Democracy
The Napoleonic Empire
Multilateral War Bargaining
Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of Civil and Interstate War
Expansion of rebellion
Why Wars Widen
Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process
War and Stability in Dynamic International Systems
Exploring the Bargaining Model of War
Fighting Battles, Winning Wars
War Expansion and War Outcome
To Intervene or Not to Intervene
Bargaining and the Nature of War
So You Say You Want a Revolution
Choosing Sides in Wars
Known Unknowns
Rationalist explanations for war
Bargaining and Learning While Fighting
Bargaining and War
Taking Sides in Wars of Attrition
The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs
The Power to Hurt
Reputation and Hegemonic Stability
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,4 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2024 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |